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Abstract
It is well recognised today that improving the investment climate fosters productive 
private investment and is the key to sustainable growth. However, the question remains 
whether an improvement in the investment climate would benefit the poor. In this 
thesis, I focus in particular on two institutions of prime importance for small informal 
entrepreneurs in developing countries who lack bargaining power and resources: the 
courts to enforce contracts and the financial markets to get access to credit.
Chapter 2 examines how the case pendency rate in state courts in India affects the 
contracting behaviour of small non-agricultural informal firms. My estimates suggest 
that a slow judiciary implies more breaches of contract, discourages firms from under­
taking relationship-specific investments, impedes the access of firms to formal financial 
institutions, and favours inefficient dynasties.
This chapter leaves an important question open. Chapter 3 examines the reasons as 
to why the judiciary is so congested in India. I find that amendments increasing the 
number or complexity of procedures to be followed by the Courts and that the ambiguity 
in the Code of Civil Procedure increase the expected duration of a trial in High Courts. 
Using the spatial and temporal variation in the enactment of amendments and occurrence 
of conflicting decisions as instrumental variables for the expected duration of a trial in 
High Court, I am then able to measure the impact of judiciary’s speed on credit markets, 
agricultural development and manufacturing performance.
Another key feature of a good investment climate is the access to credit markets. 
Chapter 4 assesses how an improvement in the access to finance through microfinance 
can benefit the poor directly. Using the technique of matching, this chapter shows a 
positive effect of microfinance on the expenditure per capita, the supply of labour, the 
level of enrolment in school of boys and girls. For instance, participants spend 3% more 
on average than non-participants. Interestingly, participants do not spend more than 
non-participants in treatment villages. This seems to indicate positive externalities.
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Chapter 1
A n Overview of the Thesis
1.1 Introduction
It is well recognised today that improving the investment climate fosters productive 
private investment, creates jobs and is the key to sustainable growth. However, the 
question remains whether an improvement in the investment climate would benefit the 
poor. Proponents of the investment climate view argue that economic growth is good for 
the poor: incomes of the poor rise by a one-to-one ratio with average income. They also 
claim that a better investment climate improve the lives of the poor directly because many 
poor people axe themselves entrepreneurs. Skeptics criticize the one-to-one relationship 
on econometric grounds. They also argue that the poor entrepreneurs are often in the 
informal sector and therefore not affected by the official regulatory environment measured 
by researchers today.
In this thesis, I will focus in particular on two institutions of prime importance for 
small informal entrepreneurs in developing countries who lack bargaining power and 
resources: the courts to enforce contracts and the financial markets to get access to 
credit. To study how an improvement in the investment climate can benefit the poor 
directly, I will focus first on a particular institution that can affect the bargaining power of 
the poor: the judiciary. To examine how slow courts can affect the lives of the poor, I will
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concentrate on small informal non-agricultural firms in India and see if slow courts shape 
their contracting behaviour. I will then explain why the judiciary is so slow in India and 
suggest some policy implications. Finally, I will turn to one type of credit institution that 
expands access to credit for the poor: microfinance, which aims to provide credit of very 
small amounts to the poor, using group-lending strategies to improve the repayment rate 
and solve the information asymmetry problem. I will study the example of the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh and see if the loans actually benefit poor people.
The main contribution of my thesis is the microeconomic study of the relationship 
between investment climate and poverty. Instead of using macroeconomic cross-country 
regressions and relying on a one-to-one relationship between incomes of the poor and 
average incomes, I use rich microeconomic datasets to asses directly the impact of two 
institutional features, enforcement of contracts and access to finance on the lives of the 
poor and to learn the exact mechanisms through which the investment climate affects 
the poor.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 motivates the 
thesis. Section 1.3 gives an overview of each chapter and is followed by the main results 
in Section 1.4.
1.2 M otivation
After the relative failure of the import-substitution strategy, the “Washington Consen­
sus” was promoted by international organizations as the development policy in the 1990s. 
It consisted in particular in privatisation, opening up of trade and deregulation. The re­
sults of this reform were varied and a number of analysts wondered whether these reforms 
provided sufficient conditions to guarantee economic development. What is lacking, ac­
cording to these analysts, is the adequate institutional framework, which would stimulate 
investment and allow the market to operate efficiently. This led international organisa­
tions such as the World Bank to focus upon changing institutions. New sources of invest­
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ment climate data were collected. The “Doing Business” project develops benchmark 
information on the operation of various regulatory regimes in more than 130 countries. 
It reports on the costs of doing business for a defined hypothetical firm and transaction 
based on the views of selected local experts (lawyers, accountants).The underlying in­
formation includes the time and costs of complying with various policy and regulatory 
frameworks. The topics studied are “Starting a Business”, “Hiring and Firing Workers” , 
“Registering Property”, “Protecting Investors”, “Closing a Business”, “Dealing with Li­
censes” , “Paying Taxes”, “Trading Across Borders”, “Getting Credit” and “Enforcing 
Contracts”. The procedural complexity, time, cost and uncertainty can then be finked to 
measures of economic performance. Investment Climate surveys are also collected. Large 
random samples of firms have been interviewed to collect assessments of constraints fac­
ing firms as well as objective quantitative data on measures of the investment climate 
and firm performance. This allows investment climate indicators to be finked with firm 
performance to better understand their impact on productivity, investment decisions, 
and employment decisions. In many cases subnational jurisdictions are included, cap­
turing variations across locations within a country. These sources of investment climate 
data allows the World Bank to provide guidelines to create or modernise the economic 
institutions of capitalism, which shape the environment in which economic activity occurs 
However, the question remains whether an improvement in the investment climate 
would benefit the poor. Indeed, the title of the World Development Report 2005, a 
synthesis of these projects, is “A Better Investment Climate for Everyone”, not just for 
the poor. The justification that a better investment climate would benefit the poor relies 
on two arguments. First, economic growth is good for the poor: incomes of the poor rise 
by a one-to-one ratio with average income. Therefore, any policy aiming at improving 
economic growth such as “a better investment climate for everyone” improves incomes of 
the poor. This statement relies on a macroeconomic cross country regression in Dollar 
(2002). The main econometric concerns are the lack of comparability across countries 
but more importantly the lack of any identification strategy. There is also evidence that
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the level of inequality in a society affects the way growth translates into rising incomes 
for the poor. It is not just that poor people’s share of income is relatively smaller in a 
more unequal society; it also rises by less than one-for-one with average incomes. Second, 
a better investment climate improves the lives of the poor directly because many poor 
people are themselves entrepreneurs. As the World Development Report says, “hundreds 
of millions of poor people in developing countries make their living as microentrepreneurs 
- as farmers, street vendors, homeworkers and in a range of other occupations”. However, 
the focus in the “Doing Business” project is largely on formal firms. Certain topics, such 
as “Starting a Business”, “Hiring and Firing Workers” , “Protecting Investors” , “Closing a 
Business”, “Dealing with Licenses” , “Paying Taxes” and “Trading Across Borders” seem 
less appropriate for small informal firms. Moreover, despite the desire to interview firms 
of all sizes, the emphasis in Investment Climate surveys and in the ’’World Business 
Environment Survey” is on formal firms. The amount of information one can gather 
about small informal microentrepreneurs is therefore limited from these new sources of 
data.
In this thesis, I will focus in particular on two items of this list of prime importance 
for small informal entrepreneurs in developing countries who lack bargaining power and 
resources: enforcing contracts and getting finance.
Slow courts make the possibility of compensation in case of a breach of contract 
remote. Theoretically, it is well know that imperfect contract enforcement can have three 
types of consequences on economic agents: adverse selection, statistical discrimination 
and moral hazard.
Potential debtors differ in how likely they are to comply with a particular contract. 
Whenever their characteristics cannot be readily assessed, the potential for adverse se­
lection arises: debtors of the wrong type may enter into a contract knowing that they 
are unlikely to satisfy their obligations but cannot be forced to comply. As a result 
creditors may refuse to contract even at terms that appear very favourable because they 
fear attracting bad types. Transactions then typically become rationed. Investigating
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the other party’s type is another response to the dangers of adverse selection. Firms will 
want to know whether trade partners are competent in their business and interested in 
establishing a long-term relationship, an indicator that they will be able to repay. Col­
lecting information on potential trading partners is costly. To economize on screening 
costs, firms may simply infer each other’s type from easily observable characteristics like 
sex, race, or ethnicity. Small differences in average type across population with different 
observable characteristics can then lead to discrimination. Moral hazard is another type 
of incentive problem that is likely to occur in commercial contracts. Success in business 
is influenced by the diligence and care with which firms conduct their operations. Moral 
hazard can arise even if the creditor perfectly observes the actions of the debtor, the fact 
that a contract is not perfectly and costlessly enforceable is sufficient. The most common 
form of incentive is the implicit promise of continued transactions as long as performance 
is satisfactory and foul play is not suspected.
Credit is essential in poor rural economies in a variety of ways. It is required to 
finance working capital and investment in fixed capital, particularly among farmers too 
poor to accumulate much saving. It is an important instrument for smoothing con­
sumption, in a context where incomes typically experience large seasonal fluctuations. 
Moreover, unusual events such as illnesses or weddings often create a pressing need to 
borrow. Apart from the intrinsic benefit of being able to weather such shocks, availability 
of credit reduces reluctance to adopt technologies that raise both mean levels and riski­
ness of incomes. The credit market thus affects output, investment, technology choices 
and inequality. A significant fraction of credit transactions in underdeveloped countries 
still takes place in the informal sector, in spite of serious government efforts to channel 
credit directly via its own banks, or by regulating commercial banks. This is largely 
because poorer farmers lack sufficient assets to put up as collateral—a usual prerequisite 
for borrowing from banks. However even informal credit markets are characterised by 
significant credit rationing, whereby borrowers are unable to borrow all they want, or 
some loan applicants are unable to borrow at all. This is well understood today: the
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world of informal credit is one of asymmetric information and incentive problems. There 
are a number of broad strands in the literature, focusing respectively on adverse selection 
(hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden action).
The adverse selection theory of credit markets originates with the paper by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). The theory rests on two main assumptions: that lenders cannot distinguish 
between borrowers of different degrees of risk, and that loan contracts are subject to 
limited liability (i.e., if project returns are less than debt obligations, the borrower bears 
no responsibility to pay out of pocket). The analysis is restricted to involuntary default, 
i.e., it assumes that borrowers repay loans when they have the means to do so. In a world 
with simple debt contracts between risk-neutral borrowers and lenders, the presence 
of limited liability of borrowers imparts a preference for risk among borrowers, and a 
corresponding aversion to risk among lenders. This is because limited liability on the 
part of borrowers implies that lenders bear all the downside risk. On the other hand, all 
returns above the loan repayment obligation accrues to borrowers. Raising interest rates 
then affects the profitability of low risk borrowers disproportionately, causing them to 
drop out of the applicant pool. This leads to an adverse compositional effect — higher 
interest rates increase the average riskiness of the applicant pool. At very high interest 
rates, the only applicants are borrowers who could potentially generate very high returns 
(but presumably with small probability). Since lenders’ preferences over project risk 
run counter to those of borrowers, they may hold interest rates at levels below market- 
clearing and ration borrowers in order to achieve a better composition and lower risk 
in their portfolio. Excess demand in the credit market may persist even in the face 
of competition and flexible interest rates. Stiglitz and Weiss’ theory was designed to 
apply quite generally, rather than in the specific context of informal credit in developing 
countries. In the latter context, the theory has often been criticized for its underlying 
assumption that lenders are not aware of borrower characteristics.
However, if the distribution of returns from the investment is affected by the bor­
rower’s actions, observability and monitoring will be a problem even for lenders who live
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in close proximity. Limited liability could then increase default risk by reducing the bor­
rower’s effort in avoiding low yield states, rather than adversely affecting the composition 
of the loan applicant pool. This is precisely the moral hazard model. Higher interest 
rates cause the problem of debt overhang — a highly indebted farmer has very little stake 
in ensuring a good harvest (i.e., remaining solvent), since the large loan repayments this 
outcome occasions imply that he captures only a small portion of the returns from the 
harvest. Keeping this in mind, lenders will be reluctant to raise interest rates beyond 
some level. As in the adverse selection theory, the interest rate may not rise enough to 
guarantee that all loan applicants secure credit, in times when loanable funds are limited. 
In general, the volume of credit and level of effort is less than first-best.
To conclude, inefficient courts particularly affect poor small informal entrepreneurs 
who lack extra legal bargaining power. Moreover, poor small entrepreneurs are affected 
by rationed credit supply because they lack the collateral to access finance and are not 
previously known from banks.
1.3 Description o f Thesis
This thesis aims at evaluating how an improvement in the investment climate will affect 
the lives of the poor informal entrepreneurs. In the absence of good contract enforce­
ment, trade and credit are restricted to a small community of people that has developed 
informal relations through kinship, repeated dealings with each other, or the security of 
available assets. Slow courts discourage entrepreneurs from entering in new relationships, 
engaging in more complex business transactions and producing more sophisticated goods 
and services. Chapter 2 studies how slow courts can affect the lives of the poor. I examine 
small informal non-agricultural firms in India and see if slow courts shape their contract­
ing behaviour. I choose India because the problem of arrears is especially large: there 
were 3.1 million cases pending in India’s 21 High Courts and 20 million in its subordinate 
courts in 2000. I also exploit the variation across states in the slowness of the courts.
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I then relate this variable to information on the contracting behaviour of 170,000 small 
informal non-agricultural firms from the 55th round of the National Sample Survey of 
2000 collected in India. To date, the literature on the finks between institutions, contract 
enforcement and economic performance has been largely macroeconomic. In contrast, I 
try to move this literature in a more microeconomic direction. I focus on one specific 
measure of institutional quality, the speed of the judiciary, which I can evaluate in an 
objective fashion. I then examine how this measure affects the contracting behaviour 
and the economic performance in a large representative sample of small non-agricultural 
firms in India. This dataset is unique in the sense that an array of questions are asked 
of firm owners concerning breaches of contract, nature of the contracts signed, access 
to credit, corporate ownership. This type of information is typically not available in 
firm-level datasets. Also, by working within a single country, I am able to control for a 
range of factors and influences which cannot be as convincingly controlled for in cross 
country data. In this sense, my chapter is in the spirit of recent papers which exploit 
policy differences across Indian states. Besley and Burgess (2004), for example, examine 
how differences in the industrial relations climate across Indian states affects manufac­
turing performance. However, in my case, I have disaggregated information on both the 
contracting behaviour and performance of small firms in India.
This research leaves an important question open. Indeed, we would like to know more 
about what determines the speed of the judiciary. In particular, we would like to identify 
specific policy measures which would enhance judicial efficiency. This is a problem both 
for India and for large number of other countries which would suffer from slow courts 
(Djankov et al, 2003). A key implication emerging from chapter 2 is that the quality of 
the judiciary has an effect on economic activity. Finding specific means of speeding up 
courts is therefore crucial.
In Chapter 3, I study the Code of Civil Procedure of India to explain why the judi­
ciary is so congested in India. I focus in particular on the state amendments to this code 
and on conflicting decisions taken by High Courts because of its ambiguity between 1971
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and 1996. I find that amendments which add procedures to be completed by the court 
significantly delay the treatment of cases. Similarly, I find that conflicting judicial deci­
sions taken in the past increase the duration of a trial as judges must spend considerable 
time in choosing between several conflicting views. I then use these state amendments 
and conflicting decisions as instrumental variables for the expected duration of a trial in 
order to measure the impact of slow judiciaries on economic performance.
It is today well recognized that the judiciary is likely to have a significant impact on 
economic activity. It is clearly understood today from the contributions by North (1990) 
that institutions defined as the organization of society, “rules of the game” are a major 
determinant of economic performance. “Property rights” institutions protect citizens 
from various forms of expropriation by elites and “contracting institutions” determine 
the terms and ease of contracting between citizens. A number of recent papers suggest 
that institutions may exert a fundamental impact on the contracting behavior of firms 
and hence on aggregate economic performance. Knack and Keefer (1995) relate some 
professional country risk measures provided by business experts to their measure of the 
quality of the judiciary which is the amount of contract-intensive money (the difference 
between M2 and cash). The intuition for this measure is that in a country with a better 
judiciary, we should see more complicated contracts involving that type of money. Ace- 
moglu et al (2001) use differences in the mortality rates faced by European colonialists to 
estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. They argue that Europeans 
could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions in places where 
they faced higher mortality rates. These institutions persisted to the present. They 
then find that the risk of expropriation, instrumented by settler’s mortality, negatively 
affects economic growth today in a cross section of countries. More recently, Djankov et 
al (2003) gathered a remarkably detailed dataset on courts performance and procedural 
formalism in a cross section of 109 countries to show that a higher procedural formalism 
coming from the legal origin is associated with a less efficient judiciary.
The innovative feature of theses studies is to try to understand the causes of the
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variation in the quality of the institutions across countries. This is not only crucial to 
understand what drives the evolution of institutions, but also econometrically useful in 
order to interpret causally the impact of institutions on any economic outcome. Indeed, 
the quality of institutions is largely endogenous to the economic performance of a country. 
However, these studies do not explain why we should see any variation in the quality of 
the judiciary inside a country. They also do not provide any guidelines for institutional 
reform. In contrast, I focus in this paper on a particular explanation for the slowness of 
the Courts in India: the Code of Civil Procedure.
Chapter 3 studies the role of the Code of Civil Procedure in explaining the judiciary’s 
performance in Indian states between 1971 and 1996. This code is often cited by legal 
experts to explain India’s poor judiciary performance over this period. The charge is 
that excessive procedural complexity and ambiguity in an antiquated text would delay 
the courts. Under Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Courts have 
power to amend, by rules, the procedure laid down in the code. In exercise of these 
powers, 430 amendments have been enacted by the different High Courts after 1968. I 
read the text of each amendment and classified each as likely to increase the speed of 
the judiciary or not. Another reading of the amendments consists in determining if the 
amendments increase procedural complexity for the courts, and therefore the expected 
duration of a trial in High Court. I also studied the 144th report of the Law Commission 
of India edited in 1992 on “Conflicting judicial decisions pertaining to the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908” , written by ex-chief justice of India K.N.Singh. This document lists 30 
sections of the Code of Civil Procedure that axe so vague that High Courts interpreted 
the text in opposite directions and violated each other’s precedents. I concentrate on the 
extreme instances where the same High Court reached a decision and, later on, its exact 
opposite. As judges must spend considerable time in choosing between several conflicting 
views, the violation of a precedent established by the same High Court at a certain time 
in a certain state could affect the expected duration of a trial in High Court. These two 
reasons help us understand why the judiciary is slow in India, why there is variation in
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the speed of the judiciary across states, how the judiciary affects economic outcomes and 
what kind of reforms are needed.
The ability to enforce a contract is critical for businesses in order to engage with 
new borrowers or customers but access to finance is also important for the success of 
entrepreneurs. I have seen that in most countries, banks will not extend credit without 
assurances that borrowers are creditworthy and that it is possible to recover the debt 
if there is a default. Poor people have no credit history and do not possess collateral: 
shallow financial markets due to information asymmetries limit the growth of poor peo­
ple’s businesses. To study how an improvement in the investment climate can benefit the 
poor, I will focus on one type of credit institution that expands access to credit for the 
poor: microfinance.
In 2002, the Grameen Bank, the first microfinance institution, lent $380 million in 3.82 
million loans with a repayment rate of 95%, in 35,000 villages and with a staff of 14,000 
people. Grameen has been replicated worldwide and has inspired 7,000 microfinance 
institutions in Latin America, Africa, Asia with 25 million poor clients. Microfinance’s 
main feature is the attribution of small loans to poor people without any collateral. All 
other development programmes are based on unequal relationships between actors: both 
funds and knowledge come from the North. Active funders confront passive beneficiaries. 
The main problem with this model is that with each operation, funds for aid decrease. 
Microfinance adds a new dimension: the microborrower becomes an active customer, 
making decisions about organisation, purchase, sales, and investments. With each credit 
operation, funds for aid actually increase. Microfinance employs private enterprise, can 
be profitable and gets money straight to the poor.
Microfinance has often been described as a win-win program. But the empirical 
evidence on the nbenefits it brings to its customers is not very clear. In Chapter 4, I 
perform an evaluation of microfinance, focusing on the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. I 
evaluate the benefits brought to its customers using the technique of matching. Statistical 
matching adjusts for differences in pre-treatment characteristics between treatment and
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non-treatment groups by pairing to each treated individual a non-treated unit with the 
“same” observable characteristics. Under the assumption that all relevant differences 
between the two groups are captured by their observable characteristics, the average 
outcome experienced by the matched pool of non-treated identifies the counterfactual 
outcome the treated units would have experienced, had they not been treated. The 
technique of matching takes into account issues of self-selection and non-random program 
placement.
The main contribution of my thesis is the microeconomic study of the relationship 
between investment climate and poverty. Instead of using macroeconomic cross-country 
regressions and relying on a one-to-one relationship between incomes of the poor and 
average incomes, I use rich microeconomic datasets to asses directly the impact of two 
institutional features, enforcement of contracts and access to finance, on the fives of the 
poor and to learn the exact mechanisms through which the investment climate affects 
the poor.
1.4 Results and Contribution
The primary contribution of this thesis is the careful evaluation of two institutions that 
have an impact on the economic activity of poor informal microentrepreneurs: the judi­
ciary, because poor entrepreneurs with limited extralegal bargaining power are adversely 
affected by an inefficient judiciary and the financial institution, because poor entrepre­
neurs often lack access to finance.
Chapter 2 shows that the quality of judicial institutions also matter both for the 
contracting behaviour and economic performance of small firms, and can actually be 
a prerequisite for access to finance. My findings are in line with an emerging, largely 
macroeconomic literature which suggests that institutions matter for economic perfor­
mance ( for example, Djankov et al (2002), Acemoglu et al (2001), Rodrik et al (2002)). 
My firm-level data is somewhat unique in the sense that it contains a great deal of in­
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formation on non-recovery of service charges/fees/credit, design of contracts, whether a 
firm is capital constrained, source of borrowing and the form of ownership. This type of 
information is typically not available in most firm-level databases.
When I relate these specific measures to the state pendency rate, I find that having 
a slower judiciary is associated with more breaches of contract, less relationship-specific 
investments, a greater shortage of capital, less access to formal financial institutions and 
a preference for family ownership of firms. These results indicate that the quality of the 
judiciary across Indian states plays an important role in shaping economic activity in this 
important sector of the economy. Moreover, I find that having slower courts in an Indian 
state is negatively associated with firm performance. My results are consistent with a 
simple game theoretic model which illustrates how having a slower judiciary will affect the 
behaviour of agents in a contracting relationship. The key insights from the theory are 
that firm owners in slow judiciary environments are more likely to break contracts, less 
likely to engage in relationship-specific investment, more likely to be credit constrained, 
less likely to have access to formal credit and more likely to keep the firm under family 
ownership. This leaves the question open of what exactly drives the slowness of the 
courts
In Chapter 3 ,1 find that amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure such as the ones 
adding or complexifying procedures for the Court affect the expected duration of a trial 
in High Court. Similarly, the ambiguity of the Code of Civil Procedure, measured by the 
violation of precedents established by the same High Court, affects the expected duration 
of a trial in High Court. This is because judges must spend a considerable time choosing 
between several conflicting views after the occurrence of such events. Finally, I relate 
the expected duration of a trial in High Court to economic outcomes. As the quality 
of institutions is endogenously related to economic performance, I cannot run a simple 
OLS regression. I use these “Court red tape” amendments and “violation of a precedent 
established by the same High Court” as instruments for the expected duration of a case 
in Trial. They represent a spatial and temporal source of variation in the duration
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of trials. As such, they could be used as instruments. I do not claim that these two 
variables are exogenous. Indeed, enacting amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure 
is responsive to the economic, political, judiciary’s conditions of the time. To alleviate 
this concern, I use amendments less responsive to the judiciary’s condition (amendments 
not purposefully designed to reduce delays in Courts such as these “Court red tape” 
amendments as opposed to “explicit speed” amendments, which explicitly mention the 
purpose of favoring expeditious justice), I perform a panel-data analysis capturing any 
time invariant differences across states in policies and outcomes and I try to control for 
factors that could have influenced the enactment of these amendments by Courts and 
I use “violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” whose temporal 
variation only comes from the occurrence of cases pertaining to ambiguous sections of 
the Code of Civil Procedure
With this instrumental variable approach, I find that the judiciary is shaping economic 
outcomes of Indian states. I find that farmers have less access to credit markets. As a 
result, agricultural development is impeded. I also find that contract-intensive sectors 
of the economy, such as registered manufacturing and trade, are adversely affected by 
weak judiciaries. The judiciary has an impact on the weaker sections of the country, 
such as the poor and farmers. The policy implications of this paper are thus very clear. 
To reduce the expected duration of a trial in High Court, the number and complexity 
of procedures that have to be followed by the courts should be reduced. Alternatively, 
the ambiguity of the Code of Civil Procedure should be reduced by simplifying and 
clarifying ambiguous and redundant rules. For example, the recommendations of Ex- 
Chief Justice of India K.N.Singh in the 144th Law Commission report on “Conflicting 
Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” should be followed. 
They have not yet been incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure. By clarifying each 
ambiguous rule, this will allow judges to save time by not having to consider several 
conflicting views.
Chapter 4 explores a potential improvement in access to finance for the poor: Micro­
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finance. By comparing participants to matched individuals in non-treated villages, I find 
that microfinance has a positive impact on the expenditure, the supply of labour, and 
the girl and boy school enrolment of participants. Participants spend in average 3% more 
than non-participants. I also find that participants did not experience a gain compared 
to non-participants in treatment villages. This seems to indicate the presence of positive 
externalities.
Taken together the main contribution of this thesis is to better understand how the 
investment climate affects the lives of the poor. I have seen that two main institutions 
are crucial for the operation of businesses of poor informal entrepreneurs. Slow courts 
impede operations of entrepreneurs because they experience more breaches of contract, 
undertake less relationship-specific investments, have less access to finance and favour 
inefficient dynasties. However, the backlog in the judiciary and confidence in the system 
could be improved by modifying the Code of Civil Procedure to decrease or simplify 
procedures and remove the ambiguities in the text by following the recommandations 
of the 144th Report. Access to finance is limited and development programs such as 
microfinance benefit the poor.
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Chapter 2
D oes the Quality o f the Judiciary  
Shape Economic A ctivity? Evidence 
from India.
2.1 Introduction
It is clearly understood today from the contributions by North (1990) that institutions 
defined as the organization of society axe a major determinant of economic performance. 
The literature, however, does not provide much evidence on how the judiciary affects 
firms’ behavior. Theoretically, it has been shown that agents could use repeated games 
and reputational threats to induce cooperation. Moreover, a formal institution such 
as the judiciary should not affect informal firms. Empirically, literature on the finks 
between institutions, contract enforcement and economic performance has been largely 
macroeconomic. In contrast, I try to move this literature in a more microeconomic direc­
tion. I focus on one specific measure of institutional quality, the speed of the judiciary, 
evaluated in an objective fashion. I then examine how this measure affects contracting 
behaviour and economic performance in a large representative sample of small informal 
non-agricultural firms in India. This dataset is unique in the sense that an array of ques­
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tions were asked to firm owners concerning breaches of contract, the nature of contracts 
signed, access to credit and corporate ownership. This type of information is typically 
not available in firm-level datasets. Also, by working within a single country, I am able 
to control for a range of factors and influences that cannot be as convincingly controlled 
for in cross country data.
The speed of the judiciary has been identified as a key problem in India. Data on cases 
pending in courts indicate that there were 3.1 million cases pending in 21 High Courts 
and 20 million in subordinate courts in 20001. Extreme examples of judicial slowness 
refer to cases taking 47 years to be resolved, by which time the plaintiff had died. Slow 
judiciaries could shape the contracting behavior of firms. First, the probability of harsh 
punishment in monetary or non-monetary terms heavily dissuades opportunistic agents 
to default ex-post on previous agreements. Slower judiciaries make the discounted value 
of punishment lower, thereby weakening incentives to cooperate. Occurences of breach 
of contract should increase. Second, if a firm wants to undertake a relationship-specific 
investment in order to supply another with a particular asset, the possibility of post- 
contractual opportunistic behavior by the partner arises once the investment costs are 
sunk. A speedy judicial system could limit post-contractual opportunistic behavior and 
foster investment. Third, slow judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behavior 
of borrowers: anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans quickly 
via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default. Creditors respond to this strategic 
behavior of borrowers by reducing the availability of credit. Fourth, in the event of a 
firm transfer and if enforcing a financial agreement with a talented manager takes time, 
firm owners might prefer to transfer control to family members.
To empirically assess the relative importance of these four mechanisms, I relate the 
speed of the judiciary, measured by the pendency percentage2, to extensive information
1 Law’s Delays: Arrears in Courts, 85th Report, Department-related parliamentary standing commit­
tee on Home affairs, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha. http://rajyasabha.nic.in/
book2 /  reports/home_aff/85threport%20.htm
2 defined as the ratio of cases pending at the end of the period to the sum of cases pending at the
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about the contracting behaviour of a representative sample of 170,000 small informal non­
agricult ural firms in India in 2000. This dataset is unique in the sense that an array of 
questions were asked to firm owners concerning breaches of contract, relationship-specific 
investment decisions3, access to credit and family ownership. This type of information 
is typically not available in firm-level datasets and allows me to test the four likely 
mechanisms through which the judiciary affects economic performance of small informal 
firms. I find that slower judiciaries are associated with more breaches of contract, less 
relationship-specific investments, a greater shortage of capital, less access to formal finan­
cial institutions and a preference for family ownership of firms. One has to be cautious 
when interpreting such results. Although issues of reverse causality do not seem pregnant 
here4, unobserved state heterogeneity could be a problem. To alleviate this concern, I 
control incrementally for firm-level variables and state-level variables and find the coef­
ficient of interest to be stable. Additionally, I interact the speed of the judiciary with a 
firm-level indicator of demand for justice to show that firms depending more heavily on 
the judiciary are more hurt by slow courts.
A number of recent papers suggest that institutions may exert a fundamental impact 
on firms’ contracting behaviour and hence on aggregate economic performance (Knack 
and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 2001). To open 
the black box of “institutions” , I focus in this paper on the judiciary, in particular its 
speed, which has been identified in India as one of its key problem. Djankov et al. (2003) 
have made an important contribution to the study of courts. They measure judicial 
formalism in 109 countries around the world. They find that judicial formalism is greater 
in civil law than in common law countries and greater formalism is associated with less
beginning of the period and cases filed during the period
3 The specificity of an investment can be precisely estimated in the sample with questions such as: 
was the design of the product specified entirely by the contractor? Was the equipment provided by 
the master unit? Were the raw materials provided by the master unit? I later define a contract as a 
relationship-specific investment contract in cases where these three questions were answered affirmatively.
4as the contracting behaviour of a small informal firm is unlikely to affect the speed of the judiciary
25
consistency, less honesty, and less fairness in judicial decisions. Endogeneity concerns are 
addressed by using legal origin as an instrument for judicial formalism. This paper differs 
in two ways. First, in contrast to Djankov et al. (2003), this paper uses a within-country 
analysis of India. By working within a single country, I am able to control for a range 
of factors and influences that cannot be as convincingly controlled for in cross country 
data. This allows one to identify the effect of judicial efficiency separately from that of 
laws, legal origin, and other country-wide characteristics. Second, the focus in my paper 
is on economic, not only judicial, outcomes.
The structure of this chapter is as follows, section 2.2 explores the channels through 
which the quality of the judiciary impacts on firms’ economic performance. I consider four 
prominent aspects in the life of a firm: breaches of contract, use of relationship-specific 
investments, access to credit markets and corporate ownership. Section 2.3 provides 
a background on the functioning of the judiciary in India and on the 55th round of 
the National Sample Survey of India on non-agricultural informal enterprises, section
2.4 presents my method, and results pertaining to the contracting behaviour of firms. 
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Breaches o f Contract
Many exchanges occur instantly and simultaneously. In this type of exchange, there is 
little reason for promises and enforcement means. Promises are made in the case of de­
ferred exchanges. The enforceability of promises encourages exchange and cooperation 
among people. For example, the judiciary is an important deterrent to any fraud that 
might be more economically attractive in the short run. The probability of harsh pun­
ishment in monetary or non-monetary terms heavily dissuades opportunistic agents to 
default ex-post on previous agreements. Slower judiciaries make the discounted value of
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punishment lower, thereby weakening incentives to cooperate.
This situation can be modelled as an agency game. The first player, the principal, 
decides to put a valuable asset under the control of a second player, the agent. The agent 
decides whether to cooperate (produce, give bank the valuable asset and share the trade 
surplus) or appropriate (keep the valuable asset). Cooperation is productive whereas 
appropriation is redistributive. In the absence of any contract enforcement, The agent’s 
best move is to appropriate. Consequently, the principal’s best move is to not enter this 
game. No activity is undertaken in the absence of enforcement means.
If a contract is signed between the two parties and is enforceable before a court, 
payoffs are radically modified. If the agent breaches, the principal receives compensatory 
damages from the agent. If compensatory damages in case of a breach are such that it 
is the agent’s best move to cooperate, then the principal’s best move is to invest. The 
purpose of enforcement is to enable people to cooperate by converting games with non 
cooperative solutions into games with cooperative solutions. It is interesting to note 
that the prospect of a distant fine because of a slow judiciary reduces the incentive to 
cooperate.
However, the judiciary is not the only mean to enforce contracts. The fear of harm 
to reputation can serve to induce parties to adhere to contracts (Bernstein, 1992; Greif, 
1993, Klein et al, 1981). A repeated agency game is used to model this situation. A 
grim-trigger strategy played by the principal induces the agent to cooperate. An enduring 
relationship does not necessarily require an effective legal system.
This is true in the case of enduring relationships with an infinite horizon. However, 
most business relationships are open-ended. Open-ended relationships have no predeter­
mined end. They can persist indefinitely or end unexpectedly. Open-ended relationships 
dissolve and reform easily as circumstances change. Assume there is an indefinite amount 
of players, who form into pairs to play each round of the previous agency game. At the 
end of each round, relationships continue in the next round or dissolve due to two rea­
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sons: unforeseeable changes or appropriation by the agent. When a relationship dissolves, 
players must search for another partner. This might be costly.
Agents can follow two strategies. First, they can cooperate until the relationship is 
dissolved by an unforeseeable event, therefore getting low and steady payoffs. Second, 
they can appropriate and search for another partner, therefore deriving high but irreg­
ular payoffs. In a competitive equilibrium, both strategies must earn the same payoff. 
Another condition for a competitive equilibrium is that principals looking for a partner 
must be willing to invest, knowing that he will be matched with a certain probability 
with appropriating agents or with cooperating agents, whose relationship has just been 
dissolved due to unforeseeable changes. Such an equilibrium exists under reasonable 
assumptions (Cooter et al, 2003).
The power of principals to exit from agency relationships makes some cooperation 
possible even in open-ended games. However, a speedy judiciary may increase the amount 
of cooperation. The low discounted value of a remote punishment given by slow courts 
does not act as a deterrent to appropriation. In contrast, by swiftly punishing breachers, 
a speedy judiciary raises the agent’s payoff of cooperation. It is interesting to note that 
as cooperation, as opposed to appropriation, is productive , economic production rises. 
This simple model predicts that a speedier judiciary is associated with less breaches of 
contract and higher economic output. In the dataset, the question “did you experience 
a problem of non-recovery of service charges/ fees/ credit?” was asked to firms. I can 
therefore test this theoretical implication.
2.2.2 Relationship-Specific Investm ent
The previous section demonstrated that more contracts are breached when judiciaries 
are of low quality. But one could also expect the quality of judiciaries to impact on 
relationship-specific investments undertaken by the firm. I consider the case where a 
firm would undertake a relationship-specific investment in order to supply another with
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a particular asset. However, as Klein et al (1978) emphasized, the possibility of post- 
contractual opportunistic behavior arises. Indeed, to induce the supplier to undertake 
an investment, a firm can either write a long-term contract with favorable terms for the 
supplier or guarantee exclusivity rights. But once the costs of the investment are sunk, 
there is an immediate incentive for the firm to renege on the contract and capture the 
suppliers’ rents. Alternatively, if search costs to find a new supplier are high, there is an 
immediate incentive for the supplier to use its monopoly power to impose higher prices. 
These frictions could reduce the incentive to invest; Klein et al (1978) conclude that 
vertical integration will supersede market systems in such cases. But another way to 
limit post-contractual opportunistic behavior is a speedy judicial system that enforces 
contracts swiftly.
It is very hard in practice to estimate what a relationship-specific investment is. A 
contribution of this chapter is to exploit the richness of the data about the type of 
contracts signed. The specificity of an investment can be precisely estimated in the 
sample with questions such as: was the design of the product specified entirely by the 
contractor? Was the equipment provided by the master unit? Were the raw materials 
provided by the master unit? I later define a contract as a relationship-specific investment 
contract in cases where these three questions were answered affirmatively. This allows me 
to test the theoreticla implication stating that a speedy judiciary should be associated 
with more relationship-specific investments
2.2.3 Access to  credit markets
We may also believe that judicial systems impact on firms’ debt contracts. As Pagano 
et al (2002) explain:
"The key function of courts in credit relationships is to force solvent bor­
rowers to repay when they fail to do so spontaneously. By the same token, 
poor judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behavior of borrowers:
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anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans easily and 
cheaply via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default. Creditors re­
spond to this strategic behavior of borrowers by reducing the availability of 
credit.”
A direct implication of this statement is that a faster judiciary, by imposing a higher 
discounted value of fines paid by the borrower, will foster credit supply. A corrolary of 
this statement concerns alternative financing means. The model of repeated game agency 
predicts that individuals will seek long-run relationships in the absence of adequate state 
protection. Long-run relationships require commitment. Traditional forms of commit­
ment include friendship, kinship. Indeed, some firms get loans from relatives or business 
partners. The advantage of such creditors over formal financial institutions is that they 
can better monitor the actions of borrowers, reduce the information asymetry between 
the two parties. On the other hand, interest rates can be prohibitive. The model pre­
dicts that as the courts get faster, borrowers will turn away from personal relationships 
towards formal financial institutions, which will be more confident in offering credit. The 
data contains information on the exact source of the loan (central and state level term 
lending institutions; government (central, state, local bodies); public sector banks and 
other commercial banks; co-operative banks and societies; other institutional agencies; 
money lenders; business partner(s); suppliers/contractors; friends and relatives) as well 
as its amount. I am therefore able to test the theoretical implication about access to 
credit markets.
2.2.4 D ynastic M anagement
Dynastic management is the inter-generational transmission of control over assets that 
is typical of family-owned firms. The most comprehensive data on corporate ownership 
around the world has been collected by La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), who 
look at the control structure of the 20 largest publicly traded companies in 27 (mostly
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wealthy) economies in 1995. On average across these countries, family ownership is the 
control structure of 30% of companies. The numbers for the middle-income countries in 
the sample are especially striking: 65% in Argentina, 50% in Greece, 100% in Mexico, 
45% in Portugal. They argue that widely held corporations should be more common 
in countries with good legal protection of minority shareholders. In these countries, 
controlling shareholders have less fear of being expropriated themselves in the event that 
they ever lose control through a takeover or a market accumulation of shares by a raider, 
and so might be willing to cut their ownership of voting rights by selling shares to raise 
funds or to diversify.
However, the firms I study here are very small firms with less than ten employees 
and are certainly not floated on stock markets. Another explanation that might be more 
adapted to the type of firms I consider in this chapter comes from Caselli, Gennaioli 
(2002). Their reasoning proceeds in two steps. First, the heir to the family firm has 
no obvious talent for managerial decision making: dynastic management is a potential 
source of inefficiency. Second, the owner of the firms; realising that his heir is untal- 
ented, would like to transfer control to new talented owners or hire talented managers. 
However, imperfect financial-contract enforcement discourages ownership changes for the 
same reason I developed in the access to credit markets section of this chapter. The 
imperfect judicial systems in developing countries could be the cause of the prevalence of 
family-owned firms and therefore of the poor economic performance of those countries. 
I know, in the case of partnership, whether the firms are family firms (partnership with 
members of the same household) or not (partnership between members not all from the 
same household). I am therefore able to test if family partnership are more prevalent in 
states with a slower judiciary..
To conclude the theoretical component of this chapter, I expect in states with a 
higher pendency rate more breaches of contract, less relationship-specific investments, 
more difficulty accessing credit market, and more family firms. These predictions are
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testable using the dataset I analyse in the following sections.
2.3 Background
The purpose of the chapter is to relate the quality of the judiciary to the contracting 
behaviour of firms. To do this, I make use of a state-level dataset of the courts. The 
judicial institutions are the same across courts and states. The Indian judiciary operates 
at three levels: a unique Supreme Court at the federal level; High Courts in each state; 
and, at lower levels, district judges for civil cases and sessions judges for criminal cases. 
India operates under a common law system which implies that the actions of High Court 
judges set precedents for the functioning of subordinate courts in that Indian state.
Data on cases pending in courts indicate that there are 3.1 million cases pending in 
21 High Courts and 20 million in subordinate courts in 2000.5 Some examples of the 
slowness of the judiciary are striking:
"the highest court in the country, the Supreme Court, took 11 years to 
acquit the headmaster of a school on the charge of taking a bribe for signing 
the salary arrears bill of his school. In another case of judicial delay, the 
victim was former Union Law Minister, Dr. B.R.Ambedkar. The judgement 
came in his lifetime but it took 47 years for the Maharashtra government to 
execute the decree passed in his favour against illegal encroachment of his 
land by Pakistani refugees. By then he was dead".6
One of the reasons for judicial delays is the shortage of judges. As Videh Upadhyay, 
a lawyer in the Supreme Court of India, states,
5Law’s Delays: Arrears in Courts, 85th Report, Department-related parlia­
mentary standing committee on Home affairs Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha. 
http://rajyasabha.nic.in/book2/reports/home_aff/85threport%20.htm
6Krishnamoorty, Dasu, Judicial Delays, Indolink, editorial analysis, 2003
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"the imperative for clearing the burgeoning judicial backlog, and hence for 
more judges and Courts, needs to be fully understood. Any lawyer practising 
in the Delhi High Court - undoubtedly one of the most important High Courts 
of the country - can testify that, on an average 60-70 cases are listed before a 
Delhi High Court Judge per day. The sheer quantum of cases forces a judge 
to adjourn most of the matters leading to further backlogs. The inevitable 
outcome: normal adjournments are for 4-6 months, the trial dates are not 
available before 2 years and settlement of suit takes place over 15 years."7
Another reason is the inadequacy of laws in India. Some provisions in place in India 
can have a positive impact on the speed of a trial. One of the major positive legal 
principles is res judicata, which means that no claim or suit can be brought to court 
more than once. Another is the rule governing the transfer of suits forbidding multiple 
suits in different places on the same issue. This statute helps reduce the backlog of the 
judiciary. But other provisions in place in India can have a negative impact. For instance, 
the Code of Civil Procedure states that a litigant does not have to appear in court in 
person. Each litigant can send a pleader instead. But the pleader cannot accept a brief in 
lieu of a litigant; hence, pleaders are often sent as a strategy to delay judgments. Another 
rule is that the plaint has to include the complete claim. However, amendments of the 
original pleadings are impossible. Therefore, the statements are prolific in language, 
leaving a wide interpretation of the plaint in the proceedings. This reduces the clarity of 
the plaint.
Therefore, speed has been identified as the key problem with the judiciary in India 
dominating all other problems such as fairness, predictability and access to the judiciary. 
I measure the speed of the judiciary with the pendency percentage, defined as:
cases pending(t)pendency percentage = cases pending(t — l)+cases filed
7Upadhyay Videh, "More cases, more judges, more courts", India Together, 2003.
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I constructed this index for 1999 from the annual report of India’s Ministry of Law, Justice 
and Company Affairs. This is an incomplete measure since the quality of a judiciary can 
also be measured by the fairness of its decisions. But the measure I employ does have the 
advantage of being an objective measure of judicial efficiency. The overall pendency (civil 
and criminal cases) is an interesting statistic since it captures the perceived efficiency of 
the judicial system and it is the perceived efficiency of the judicial system that will affect 
the contracting behaviour of firms.
One attractive feature of this Indian data is the variation in pendency percentage 
across states. This is due to the common law system which compared with the civil 
law system, is much less codified. This liberty enables the judiciary to interpret the 
law more flexibly, and to adjust quickly to new developments. In particular, The Code 
of Civil Procedure, which defines the rules of a trial from the filing of a suit to the 
execution of a verdict, leaves great discretion to judges to either streamline the process 
or make it more complex. Due to the common law system, the decisions of High Courts 
concerning disputes about statutes of the Code of Civil Procedure set precedents for the 
respective subordinate courts. This is why a High Court’s ruling can enhance or impair 
the efficiency of all courts within its jurisdiction. For example, an order in the Code 
of Civil Procedure states that the court may "grant an adjournment if sufficient cause 
is shown". The perception of sufficiency varies significantly among High Courts: the 
Calcutta High Court decided that the absence of a lawyer is not a cause to adjourn trial, 
whereas the Allahabad High Court granted a similar request. This example is particularly 
interesting as it shows that different interpretations of the same law in different states 
can have an impact on the speed of the judiciary.8
It is often claimed that the judicial system has only a limited impact on the economy 
because people resort to alternative dispute resolution institutions, in particular informal 
ones. Koehling (2002) describes two types of such informal institutions in India: Pan-
8 See Koehling (2002) for a more extensive analysis of the Indian judiciary.
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chayats and rural planning commissions. Both institutions play a crucial role in settling 
and avoiding rural disputes. The Panchayats, with their limited judicial authority, are 
used to settle disputes about land usage, tenure and commons. As locally-bound institu­
tions, they are highly efficient since they are familiar with the situation and the litigants 
at the village level. Correspondingly, the level of acceptance among the population is 
high. In the case of dispute resolutions, Panchayats can impose very limited sanctions, 
but the social pressure created by a judgement serves as a strong incentive to comply 
with the judgement. Rural planning commissions submit proposals for infrastructure 
projects such as water dwelling, road improvement to the respective state’s authorities. 
Their involvement ensures broad participation of the affected population, and provides 
the basis for a distribution of public goods and services according to the needs of the 
poor. They are the first contact point for administrative complaints, and thus do pre­
vent disputes before the projects are implemented. I therefore collect information on the 
number of these entities, and use this as a control in my regressions.
My aim in this chapter is to relate these measures of judicial efficiency to firm’s 
contract behaviour. In this regard, I turn to a representative sample of 170,000 small 
informal firms in India. This dataset is the 55th round of the National Sample Survey 
in India collected in 1999/2000 for small non-agricultural firms.9 There are several char­
acteristics of this dataset that make it appropriate for use in identifying the impact of 
judicial delays on contracting behaviour. First, a detailed list of problems experienced 
by the firm was collected. Each firm reported if it found that the non-recovery of service 
charges, fees or credit was a major obstacle to its operation. I interpret this problem as 
a breach of contract. Second, a detailed questionnaire about the type of contracts used 
is also available. I know if the firm operated on a contract basis, and if so, the type 
of contract it .used. For example, I know if the equipment and raw materials were self­
procured, supplied by the master unit/contractor, or both. I also know if the design was
9See Data Appendix for details of variables and an outline of the sampling design.
35
specified by the contractor. Third, I have information about the access to credit markets. 
Each firm was asked if it found that the shortage of capital was a major problem to its 
operation. Related to this, a wealth of information on the source of loans is reported. I 
know if the loan was granted from a central and state-level term lending institution, a 
government (central, state, local bodies), public sector banks, commercial banks, other 
institutional agencies, money lenders, business partners, suppliers/contractors, or friends 
and relatives. Fourth, we have information on the type of ownership of the firm, whether 
it is a partnership with members of the same household or not. Finally, a wide range of 
more conventional information is also available for each firm: the full characteristics of 
all employees, the firm’s capital stock, and factor incomes, the source and destination of 
the firm’s final product, and the sector in which the firm is operating (to the 5-digit level 
in the National Industry Classification).
2.4 M ethods and Results
To relate judicial efficiency to contracting behaviour, I perform regressions of the form:
Vija  —  OtQ +  f i p s  - f -  5 SZ S - f -  ' Y i j s X j /j s  - } -  O i j d j  - f -  £ i j s
where i corresponds to the firm, j  to the sector studied, and s to the state. The variable 
yijS represents the outcome variable of interest; first this will be the firm’s contracting 
behaviour, and later its performance. In this specification, determinants of the outcome 
include a constant (a0), the pendency percentage (ps), a vector of state-level controls 
(Zs), a vector of firm-level controls (X^-s) and sector-fixed effects (dj). The coefficient of 
interest is therefore /?.
My research design begins with a simple examination of the correlation between the 
contracting behaviour outcomes and the pendency percentage, and then incrementally 
adds control variables to that regression in order to check the robustness of the result.
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The state-level controls (Zs)10 consist of the following: state gross domestic product 
per capita and per capita income growth rate, to control for overall economic develop­
ment; the state school enrolment and literacy rates, to control for educational attainment; 
state amount of credit per capita, to control for overall development of the financial sec­
tor; state expenditure on the organs of state and the unit cost per policemen, to control 
for the part of the state budget devoted to the enforcement of law and order; the state 
length of roads per capita and access to safe drinking water, to control for the quality of 
infrastructure; and finally, the state death rate and state male life expectancy to control 
for health sector development.
The firm-level variables (Xij3)n  consist of the following: indebtedness, to control for 
the disciplinary effect that an increase in indebtedness has on the use of available funds; 
level of interest payments as a proportion of firms’ profits, to control for the likelihood 
of bankruptcy; amount of capital accruing from financial institutions, to control for the 
firm’s ability to gain access to sources of financing; proportion of temporary to total 
employment in the firm, to control for for labour productivity12; gender of the owner, to 
control for any gender-specific effects on firm performance13; number of unrelated other 
activities undertaken by the owner, to control for time spent on the firm’s activities; and 
finally, whether or not the firm is registered, to control for the level of informality of the 
business.
I also include sector dummies (dj) to control for sector-specific effects. I use sim­
ple probit regressions when the outcome is a dummy variable. I do not expect much
10 See Data Appendix for sources of the variables.
11 See Data Appendix for sources of the variables.
12 The expected effect of this variable on productivity is ambiguous. It is possible that the incentives 
for the firm to earmark resources to investment in human capital axe greater in the case of a full-time 
working relationship. Alternatively, temporary labour might provide a firm with increased flexibility to 
adapt to changes in its environment. Furthermore, it could be argued that temporary workers have an 
incentive to make a greater effort with the aim of becoming permanent.
13The impact of female ownership on firm performance is ambiguous. Many studies indicate that 
businesses owned by women underperform those of men. One of the difficulties faced by women in 
operating their own small business is family responsibilities which limit the hours they are able to spend 
working in their small businesses.
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endogeneity because there is no reverse causality between a small firm of less than ten 
employees14 and the quality of the judiciary. I use robust standard errors and a clustered 
sampling strategy at the level of the state because I include state-level variables in a 
micro-econometric survey (Moulton, 1990).
2.4.1 Basic Results
Table 2.1 examines the relationship between contracting behaviour and the quality of 
the judiciary. The dependent variable is the occurrence of breach of contract and the 
sole determinant is the pendency percentage. The dependent variable was obtained from 
a list of problems commonly experienced by the firms. One such problem is defined 
as: ‘non-recovery of service charges/ fees/ credit’. This relates to cases where there has 
been a breach of contract. I therefore construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm experienced this type of problem as one of its main problems, and 0 if not. I cal­
culate in column (1) a simple correlation between these two variables. I incrementally 
add state-level control variables in column (2), firm-level control variables in column (3) 
and sector dummy variables in column (4). The results are all statistically significant 
which strengthens the claim that there is a significant relationship between the pendency 
rate and the contracting behaviour of firms. This result is consistent with proposition
1. Column (4) of Table 2.1 indicates that if the pendency percentage increases by one 
percentage point, then the probability that the firm will experience a breach of contract 
will increase by 0.1 percent. This result is quite weak and although statistically signif­
icant seems economically insignificant. However, the ranges of pendency percentages in 
India must be borne in mind. In 1999, the pendency percentage varied across states 
between 45% and 90%. The following interpretation of the coefficient /3 can therefore be 
devised. Based on the coefficients of the regression and using the standard cumulative 
normal function, which is the definition of the probit function, the probability that an
14 55% of the firms in the dataset used in this paper have one worker.
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average firm in the average state will experience a breach of contract, where the pendency 
percentage is 45%, can be estimated. I estimated the same quantity for the average firm 
in the average state with a pendency percentage of 90%. The difference between these 
two probabilities is 5 percentage points. The results can be interpreted in the following 
way: the probability that the average firm in the average state will experience a breach of 
contract is 5 percentage points higher if the pendency percentage varies from the lowest 
rate to the highest rate in India.
Table 2.2 looks at the nature of contracts as a function of the quality of the judiciary. 
The dependent variable represents whether or not a firm is operating on a contractual 
basis and the explanatory variable is the pendency percentage. As discussed earlier, the 
dataset contains detailed information about the contractual environment under which 
these firms are operating. I therefore constructed a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm was working on a contract basis and 0 if not. Column (1) of Table 2.2 does not 
indicate any relationship between the quality of the judiciary and that variable. This 
may be due to the fact that only 7 percent of the firms in the dataset operate on a 
contractual basis. However, instead of evaluating the impact that the judiciary has on 
the number of contracts entered into, it is more instructive to assess the impact that 
the judiciary has on contract design. The dataset contains additional information on the 
nature of these contracts. In particular, three questions were asked to the firms: was the 
design of the product specified entirely by the contractor, was the equipment provided 
by the master unit, and were the raw materials provided by the master unit. I define 
the contract as a relationship-specific investment contract if these three questions were 
answered in the affirmative. Indeed, the definition of a relationship-specific investment 
is an investment of capital that could not be used in another activity, or if so used would 
result in a great loss of value. In columns (2) to (5) of Table 2.2, I keep only the firms 
working on a contract basis, amongst which some signed a relationship-specific investment 
contract. By reducing the size of the sample, I hope to be able to pinpoint a significant
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relationship between the quality of the judiciary and the likelihood to sign a relationship- 
specific investment contract. I incrementally add control variables from column (2) to 
column (5). Column (5) illustrates that fewer relationship-specific investment contracts 
are signed in states with higher pendency rates. This provides support for proposition
2. An economic interpretation of this result is that the average firm in the average state 
is 4 percentage points less likely to undertake a relationship-specific investment if the 
judiciary is the slowest of India as opposed to the fastest.
Table 2.3 examines the influence of the judiciary on firm’s access to credit markets. 
The dependent variable is information on loans and the explanatory variable of interest 
is the pendency percentage. The dependent variable used in the regression of column(l) 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm experienced a shortage of capital as one of its 
problems, and 0 otherwise. A higher pendency means more problems of that type. This 
result can be interpreted in the following way: the probability that the average firm in 
the average state will experience a shortage of capital increases by 7 percentage points 
if the judiciary is the slowest as opposed to the fastest. In column (2), the dependent 
variable represents whether or not the firm had an outstanding loan at the time of the 
survey. I find that fewer firms have outstanding loans where the rate of pendency is 
higher. The average firm in the average state will find it 3.5 percentage points harder 
to get a loan with the slowest judiciary in India, relative to the fastest. An interesting 
test is to refine the analysis to factor in the exact source of the loan. Column (3) 
demonstrates that it is 2 percentage point harder to obtain a loan from formal financial 
institutions in states with a slow judiciary. As predicted, column (4) shows that it is 
harder to secure a loan from strangers (suppliers, contractors, moneylenders) although 
the statistical significance of this result is not very high. Turning to loans from friends, 
relatives and business partners (column (5)), there are very few firms in this category so 
I restrict attention to the sample of firms that obtained a loan. Among this subset of 
firms, column (5) demonstrates that loans are more likely to come form friends, relatives,
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and business partners when the judiciary is slow. This agrees with the notion that people 
tend to operate in small business networks in areas where the pendency rate is higher. 
The average firm to have obtained a loan will be 16 percentage points more likely to have 
obtained it from a relative than from other sources if the judiciary is the slowest in India 
as opposed to the quickest. This result is consistent with Proposition 3, which holds that 
agents should obtain more loans from friends and less from banks in situations where 
there is a slow judiciary.
Table 2.4 looks at the nature of the ownership of the firm as a function of the quality of 
the judiciary. I restrict the sample to firms engaged in partnerships as opposed to single- 
ownership firms, as the partnerships firms have further data on the relationships between 
partners. There are two possible types of partnership: partnership with members of 
the same household and partnership between members not all from the same household. 
Dynastic management corresponds to the first category of partnership. Control variables 
are added incrementally in the four columns. Column (4) illustrates that there axe more 
partnerships with members of the same household in states with a slow judiciary. The 
average firm engaged in a partnership in the average state is 9 percentage points more 
likely to be a family firm if the judiciary is the slowest of India as compared to the 
fastest. This is consistent with Proposition 4 which says that family firms should be 
more prevalent in states with a slower judiciary.
These basic results can be refined using the methodology of Raj an and Zingales 
(1998). The intuition is that a good judicial system should disproportionately help firms 
typically dependent on the judicial system for their growth. I will construct the test as 
follows. A sector’s need for the judicial system is identified from data on U.S. firms. The 
need for the judicial system will be measured by the vertical integration of the firms. 
Indeed, a highly vertically integrated firm does not rely on the judicial system since all 
activities are internalized. On the contrary, a non vertically integrated firm relies on 
many suppliers or customers and therefore is more dependent on the judicial system.
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The vertical integration of the firms will be measured by the ratio of the value added 
generated in the firm to the total sales. If that indicator is 1, then it means that all the 
creation of value comes from within the firm. If that indicator is 0, it means that a firm 
is not highly vertically concentrated. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), I make two 
very important assumptions. First, it is considered that the judicial system is optimal 
in the United States. This method allows us to identify a sector’s technological demand 
for a judicial system. Second, it is assumed that such a technological demand carries 
over to other countries. I then examine whether industries that are more dependent 
on the judicial system experience more problems of breach of contract, undertake fewer 
relationship-specific investments, suffer from shortages of capital or are more likely to be 
family firms.
Data for vertical integration in the US was gathered from the Industrial Statistics 
Database 2003 at the 3- and 4-digit level of ISIC Code (Revision 3) put together by 
the United Nations Statistical Division.15 I then construct the interaction between the 
demand for justice (defined as 1 minus the vertical integration) at the NIC2 level and 
the pendency percentage.
Table 2.5 column (1) and (2) show no significant impact. In Table 2.5 column (3), the 
dependent variable is the occurrence of a shortage of capital. It can be seen that a firm 
operating in a sector which is dependent on the judicial system in the USA suffers more 
from a slow judiciary than a firm operating in a sector not dependent on the judiciary. In 
column (4), the dependent variable is the likelihood of being a family firm. We see that 
a firm in a sector that would be dependent on the judicial system in the USA is more 
likely to be a family firm than a firm in a sector not dependent on the judiciary. I tested 
if my results did not depend on the choice of the benchmark country by gathering the 
data for Canada. The last four columns of Table 2.5 show that the result is comparable 
and according to what expected.
151 restrict the sample to manufacturing firms following Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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This extension provides an additional insight compared to the basic results in the sense 
that the effect of the judiciary depends on the demand for justice by a firm. Sectors that 
are typically more dependent on the judiciary would suffer more from a slow judiciary.
2.4.2 R obustness checks
To lend support to the previous set of estimates, I now perform a series of robustness 
checks.
The first robustness check concerns the efficiency measure of the judicial system. It 
must be determined whether or not the results obtained are sensitive to the particular 
measure of the quality of the judiciary used. Table 2.6 looks at the relationship between 
the occurrence of a breach of contract and the quality of the judiciary using various 
measures of the quality of the judiciary as an explanatory variable. I used successively 
in column (1) to (6) the pendency percentage of total cases in High Courts in 1999 (from 
Annual Report, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs); the pendency percentage 
of total cases in High Courts in 1998 (same source); the expected duration of a trial in 
High Court in 1996 (measured in number of pending cases at the beginning of the period 
plus number of filed cases within the year divided by the number of cases disposed of 
within the year from Law commission reports, Annual Reports of the Ministry of Law 
and Justice); the corresponding pendency rate in 1996 (defined as 1-1/duration); the 
expected duration of a trial in High Court in 1995; and the corresponding pendency rate 
in 1995. Columns (1) to (6) of Table 2.6 show that the positive result remains unchanged 
even while the pendency rate is measured at different times, from different sources or 
relating to other types of cases.
A potential problem with using the pendency rate as a measure of the quality of 
the judiciary is the possibility of out of court settlements. Indeed, if contracting parties 
are aware that they are unlikely to achieve an expeditious verdict, they might be more 
inclined to resolve disputes by way of settlement. This could artificially reduce the
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backlog of cases the judiciary is treating. The pendency rate could be influenced by the 
settlements and a low pendency rate would not be evidence of an efficient judiciary.
A similar problem might arise if the assumption made in section 2.2.1, about random 
matching between a seller and a buyer, is relaxed. It could be argued that, faced with 
a slow judicial system, a seller would seek to acquire information about his partner in 
order to solve the information asymmetry. This would enable him to deal only with 
patient agents who would be willing to cooperate, thereby creating a business network, 
as opposed to the anonymous market where players are matched randomly. Kali (1999) 
develops a theory of business networks where they are endogenous to the reliability of 
the legal system. He finds that the existence of networks exerts a negative effect on 
the functioning of the anonymous market. This is because the networks absorb honest 
individuals, raising the density of dishonest individuals engaged in anonymous market 
exchange. If agents could self-select in small groups where information is shared and 
no default occurs, this would surely reduce the number of breaches of contract in the 
economy, unclog the judiciary and make it artificially efficient. In that case again, a low 
pendency rate would not be evidence of an efficient judiciary.
These two points of criticism arise from the fact that the measure of the efficiency 
of the judiciary used relates to the demand for justice as well as the supply of justice. 
Indeed, the pendency rate is defined as:
pending(t)
pendency percentage =  pending(t _  1)+filed 
Considering the following identity:
pending(t — 1) +filed=pending(t) -f-solved 
the pendency percentage can be rewritten as:
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pending (t — l)+filed-solved 
pendency percentage =  pending(t _  1)+filed
This expression of the pendency percentage includes the quantity of cases filed. The 
pendency rate depends both on how many cases were resolved (the supply of justice) 
and the number of new cases brought (the demand for justice). I am interested in the 
effect of the supply of justice on contracting behaviour of firms, but that effect here is 
confounded by the demand for justice. In particular, if the number of new cases increases, 
the pendency rate goes up. An increasing pendency rate would not be evidence of an 
increasingly inefficient judiciary but would merely reflect the litigious nature of agents.
To solve this particular problem, a measure of the efficiency of the judiciary that 
focuses more on the supply side of justice can be employed. I considered the following 
indicator:
solved
pending
This indicator would only reflect the capacity of judges to solve cases. A high ratio 
would indicate that many pending cases are being treated. Column (7) of Table 2.6 
shows that this indicator is positively correlated with breach of contract. Indeed, I find 
that all results presented in this chapter are robust to the use of this alternative measure 
of judicial efficiency. This confirms the conclusion that the efficiency of the judiciary in 
dealing with pending cases affects the contracting behaviour of firms.
In order to explain the similarity of the results, it is necessary to look at the deter­
minants of cases filed and cases pending in India. Column (1) of Table 2.7 demonstrates 
that the number of cases pending per judge does not depend on the number of cases filed 
per judge. This result would be characteristic of a judicial system where a judge solves 
more cases as the number of cases filed increases in order to keep constant the amount 
of cases pending. This is confirmed in Column (2) of Table 2.7 where the number of 
cases disposed per judge is positively correlated, by a one-to-one ratio, with the number
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of cases filed per judge. The number of cases pending cannot be explained by the num­
ber of cases registered. Other operational factors such as scarceness of means are more 
important in determining the amount of cases pending. An indicator of the scarceness 
of means is the number of judges that would be required for a well-functioning judiciary 
in any state. This indicator is positively correlated with the number of cases pending as 
can be seen in column (3) of Table 2.7. The conclusion that can be drawn from Table 
2.7 is that the number of cases pending does not depend on the number of cases filed. 
Therefore, if less cases are filed due to out of court settlements or due to the creation of 
business networks, this would not have an impact on the number of cases pending.16
Another concern is that the judicial system is inconsequential as firms endeavour to 
avoid it through using methods of alternative dispute resolution. The impact of alterna­
tive dispute resolutions mechanisms may be measured by the number of panchayats per 
capita and the number of rural planning commissions per capita. Although such num­
bers do not reflect the quality of the institutions themselves, they do indicate whether 
the system is working in the respective state or not, as the majority of institutions are 
not imposed by the government and thus only come into existence if they are supported 
by the population itself. I have included in the regressions the number of panchayats and 
the number of rural planning commissions as additional state controls. The variable of 
interest remains significant.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows that the quality of judicial institutions in Indian states matter both for 
the contracting behaviour and economic performance of small firms. My findings are in 
line with an emerging, largely macroeconomic literature which suggests that institutions 
matter for economic performance ( for example, Djankov et al (2002), Acemoglu et al
16 Note that the pendency percentage collapses to an indicator similar to the last indicator if the 
number of cases solved is equal to the number of cases filed.
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(2001), Rodrik et al (2002)). My firm-level data is somewhat unique in the sense that 
it contains a great deal of information on non-recovery of service charges/fees/credit, 
design of contracts, whether a firm is capital constrained, source of borrowing and the 
form of ownership. This type of information is typically not available in most firm-level 
databases.
When I relate these specific measures to the state pendency rate, I find that having 
a slower judiciary is associated with more breaches of contract, less relationship-specific 
investments, a greater shortage of capital, less access to formal financial institutions and 
a preference for family ownership of firms. These results indicate that the quality of the 
judiciary across Indian states plays a role in shaping economic activity in this important 
sector of the economy. My results are consistent with a simple game theoretic model 
which illustrates how having a slower judiciary will affect the behaviour of agents in 
a contracting relationship. The key insights from the theory are that firm owners in 
slow judiciary environments axe more likely to break contracts, less likely to engage in 
relationship-specific investment, more likely to be credit constrained, less likely to have 
access to formal credit and more likely to keep the firm under family ownership.
This research leaves important questions open. The first is that we would like to 
know more about what determines the speed of the judiciary. In particular, we would 
like to identify specific policy measures which would enhance judicial efficiency. This 
is a problem both for India and for large number of other countries which would suffer 
from slow courts (Djankov et al, 2003). A key implication emerging from this chapter 
is that the quality of the judiciary has an effect on economic activity. Finding specific 
means of speeding up courts is therefore an important area for future work. In India, 
the fact that there is a common law system in place would suggest that the actions 
of High Court judges may be an important determinant of the speed of the judiciary. 
Linking the rulings of these judges to court functioning is an area of research that I plan 
to take up in the future. The second key question that remains open concerns whether
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the effects of a slow judiciary vary across sectors of an economy. One can imagine for 
example that firms in the registered or formal manufacturing sector in India may have 
fewer contracting problems than the informal firms that I examine in this chapter. In 
future work, I plan to extend my analysis to firms in other sectors of the Indian economy 
as a means of testing this hypothesis.
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Table 2.1: The impact o f pendency on the occurrence of breach of contract
(1) (2) (3)____________ (4)
Dependent Variable non-■recovery of service charges, fees, credit
pendency percentage of total 
cases in High Courts in 1999
0.1546
(3.03)***
0.0948
(2.82)***
0.1012
(3.00)***
0.1113
(4.28)***
state-level controls no yes yes yes
firm-level controls no no yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) no no no yes
Observations 176130 176130 172533 172484
• non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit: =1 if the entreprise experienced a major problem of 
non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit; =0 otherwise.* Probit regressions. Robust z-statistics in 
parentheses, clustered at the level of the state.* * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%.* Rather than the coefficients, we report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in 
each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy 
variables.* Multipliers defined as the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to 
the sampling design are used as weights in the regressions.
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Table 2.2: The impact o f pendency on the probability of working on a contract basis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 r o l a + i n r i o V i i r L C n Q p i f i p  i T n r o o + m o n f  / • • /v n + 'r a r W -^Dependent Variable contract1 relationship-specific investment contract2
pendency percentage of total 
cases in High Courts in 1999
0.1080
(1.63)
-0.0231
(0.18)
-0.1255
(2.45)**
-0.1837
(3.61)***
-0.1144
(1.89)*
state-level controls yes no yes yes yes
firm-level controls yes no no yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) yes no no no yes
Observations 166085 12295 12295 12011 11989
•’ =1 if the entrepise works on a contract basis; =0 otherwise. • 2 =1 if the entreprise undertakes a relationship- 
specific investment contract; =0 otherwise (restricted to the entreprises working on a contract basis).* a relationship- 
specific investment contract is defined as a contract where the design is specified by the contractor and when the 
equipment/raw material is supplied by the master unit/contractor.* Probit regressions. Robust z-statistics in paren­
theses, clustered at the level of the state.* * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.* Rather 
than the coefficients, we report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, con­
tinuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.* Multipliers defined as 
the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to the sampling design are used as weights in the 
Regressions.
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Table 2.3: The impact o f pendency on shortage o f capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
i /'Q n i'fo l -* -  l n a n ^  f r v r m a l  K n o i n o o o  I n a n ^  ^ r o l o + n r o "Dependent Variable shortage of capital1 loan2 for al loan3 business loan4 "relative" loan5
pendency percentage of total 
cases in High Courts in 1999
0.4105
(4.53)***
-0.0519
(3.26)***
-0.0406
(4 19)***
-0.0189
(1.03)
0.3347
(9.12)***
state-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 172533 176127 175792 175709 15641
• Shortage of capital:=l if the entreprise experienced a major problem of shortage of capital; =0 otherwise. The different sources
of loan are: central and state level term lending institutions; government (central, state, local bodies); public sector banks and other 
commercial banks; co-operative banks and societies; other institutional agencies; money lenders; business partner(s); suppliers/contractors; 
friends and relatives; others.*2loan:=l if the entreprise got a loan; =0 otherwise.#3formal loan: =1 if the entreprise got a loan from 
lending institutions, government, banks; =0 otherwise.*4business loan: =1 if the entreprise got a loan from suppliers/contractors and 
moneylenders; =0 otherwise.*5 "relative" loan: =0 if the entreprise got a loan from friends and relatives or the business partner; =0 
otherwise (among the entreprises which got a loan; this restriction is imposed because we observed too few loans of that type).* Probit 
regressions. Robust z-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state.* * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%.* Rather than the coefficients, we report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous 
variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.* Multipliers defined as the inverse of the probability 
that the observation is included due to the sampling design are used as weights in the regressions.
Table 2.4: The impact of pendency on the type of ownership
(i) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable dynasty1
pendency percentage of total 
cases in High Courts in 1999
0.2937
(1.04)
0.4487
(2.92)***
0.3118
(1.97)**
0.2937
(2.14)**
state-level controls no yes yes yes
firm-level controls no no yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) no no no yes
Observations 3619 3619 3540 3535
• There are two possible types of partnership: partnership with members of the same household 
and partnership between members not all from the same household.* 1dynasty=l if the type of 
partnership is the one with members of the same household; =0 otherwise.* Probit regressions. 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state.* * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.* Rather than the coefficients, we report the change in the 
probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, 
the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.* Multipliers defined as the inverse of 
the probability that the observation is included due to the sampling design are used as weights in 
the regressions.
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Table 2.5: The im pact o f  th e  interaction between pendency and the dem and for justice
on th e contracting behaviour o f the firm
___________________ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
demand for justice calculated in the USA demand for justice calculated in Canada
Dependent variable breach1 RSI contract2 shortage3 dynasty4 breach1 RSI contract2 shortage3 dynasty4
interaction pendency percentage 
in 1999 and demand for justice5
0.0132
(0.07)
0.2783
(1.12)
0.4549
(2.38)**
0.6008
(1.82)*
0.172
(1.62)
-0.2006
(1.91)*
0.2676
(1.74)*
0.5649
(1.61)
state-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 50063 8655 50112 936 44490 7944 44506 797
• 1non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit: =1 if the entreprise experienced a major problem of non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit; 
=0 otherwise. *2=1 if the entreprise undertakes a relationship-specific investment contract; =0 otherwise (restricted to the entreprises working on a 
contract basis).^shortage of capital:=l if the entreprise experienced a major problem of shortage of capital; =0 otherwise.* 4dynasty=l if the type 
of partnership is the one with members of the same household; =0 otherwise.*5the interaction term is calculated as the product of the pendency 
percentage in High Courts in 1999 (at the level of the state) and the demand for justice of the firm (at the level of the sector). The demand for 
justice is calculated for each sector of manufacturing in United States (or in Canada) as one minus the vertical integration of the sector; the vertical 
integration being measured as the ratio of value added to total sales.* Probit regressions. Robust z-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of 
the state.* * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.* Rather than the coefficients, we report the change in the probability for an 
infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.* Multipliers 
defined as the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to the sampling design are used in the regressions.
Table 2.6: The impact of different measures of pendency on the occurrence of breach of contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pendency percentage of total cases 
in High Courts in 1999 
pendency percentage of total cases 
in High Courts in 1998 
expected duration of a trial 
in High Court in 19961 
pendency rate in 962
expected duration of a trial 
in High Court in 19951 
pendency rate in 952
number of cases solved divided by 
number of cases pending inl999
0.1113
(4.28)***
0.1350
(7.41)***
0.0169
(8.98)***
0.0568
(5.86)***
0.0184
(8.70)***
0.0553
(5.65)***
-0.0513
(4.78)***
state-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
sector dummies (NIC2) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 172484 172484 172484 172484 172484 172484 172484
• Dependent Variable: non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit: =1 if the entreprise experienced a major problem of non-recovery of 
service charges, fees, credit; =0 otherwise.^expected duration of a case in High Court, measured in number of pending cases at the beginning 
of the period plus number of filed cases within the year divided by the number of cases disposed of within the year. Unit=years. Source: Law 
commission reports, Annual Reports of the Ministry of Law and Justice.*2the pendency rate is therefore defined as 1-1/duration.Note: pending
beginning+filed=pending end+solved.* 3 obtained from the governmental publication "Crime in India".* Probit regressions. Robust z-statistics 
in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state.* * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.* Rather than the coefficients, 
we report the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change 
in the probability for dummy variables.* Multipliers defined as the inverse of the probability that the observation is included due to the sampling 
design are used as weights in the regressions.
Table 2.7: The judiciary’s technology
__________ (1) (2) (3)____________(4)
Dependent Variable number of solved cases number of pending cases (end year)
number of filed cases 0.4880 0.8157 1.1652 1.1117
(2 .8 8 )* (8.96)*** (2.89)* (1.76)
total population 0.8717 -0.4881 5.1621 6.0055
(1.55) (1.39) (1.75)* (1.75)
population growth rate 0.3384 -4.5837
(0.79) (1.98)*
Four-year lagged per capita -2.0597 17.7354
education expenditure (1 .2 1 ) (1.53)
Four-year lagged per capita 0.0113 0.8461
health expenditure (0 .0 1 ) (0.14)
Four-year lagged per capita 9.5364 -57.7160
other expenditure (2.03)* (1.35)
Four-year lagged state taxes as a 5.3878 -49.3674
percentage of state domestic product (1.76)* (1.72)
state fixed effects yes yes yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Constant -6,690.6195 7,729.2324 10,539.6074 27,306.8007
(3.20)*** (0.58) (0.90) (0.26)
Observations 400 311 400 311
R-squared 0.92 0.99 0.89 0.92
• Data from 1971 to 1995 for 16 states (=400 observations).* Panel data regressions with state and year fixed effects. • 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.* Block bootstrapped significance tests are reported next to 
the t-statistics.
Variable
D ata  Appendix: Tabic <_>f means
source N. of obs. Mean Std. Dev.
P e n d e n c y  p e r c e n t a g e  i n  1 9 9 9 16 0.69 0.14
Pendency percentage in 1998 16 0.67 0.14
Expected duration of a trial in High Court in 1996 (years) Annual Report 16 2.5 1.32
Pendency percentage in 1996 Ministry of Law, 16 0.45 0.32
Expected duration of a trial in High Court in 1995 (years) Justice and Company Affairs 16 2.40 1.24
Pendency percentage in 1996 16 0.43 0.32
Number of cases solved divided by number of cases pending in 1999 16 0.23 0.21
probability of non-recovery of service charges, fees, credit 176133 0.10 0.31
probability of working on a contract basis 176133 0.07 0.26
probability of relationship-specific investment contract when contract 12621 0.65 0.48
probability of shortage of capital 176133 0.42 0.49
having obtained a loan 176133 0.09 0.28
loan from a formal institution (financial institutions, government, bank) 176133 0.03 0.18
loan from a business friend (contractor, moneylender) National Sample Survey 176133 0.03 0.17
loan from a relative(relative, partner) conditional on having a loan 55th (2000) round 15668 0.15 0.35
partnership with members of the same household when partnership 3619 0.51 0.50
Indebtedness 176133 0.10 3.09
Level of interest payments as a proportion of firms’ profits 176133 0.01 0.08
Proportion of temporary to total employment in the firm 176133 0.08 0.22
Gender of the owner 176133 0.09 0.28
Number of unrelated other activities undertaken by the owner 176133 0.50 1.32
Registration of the firfti 176133 1.78 0.41
State gross domestic product per capita 176133 14.22 5.30
Per capita income growth rate 176133 2.52 2.29
State school enrolment 176133 83.58 16.35
Literacy rates Economic Surveys, 176133 65.38 9.88
State amount of credit per capita http://indiabudget.nic.in/ 176133 0.42 0.41
State length of roads per capita 176133 2.57 1.40
Access to safe drinking water 176133 65.25 18.65
State death rate 176133 8.50 1.25
State male life expectancy 176133 64.39 3.1
State expenditure on the organs of state Rajya Sabha and Lok 176133 19809 9171
Unit cost per policemen Sabha unstarred 176133 118359 15272
Number of Panchayats per million inhabitants questions, 176133 236.4 130.15
Number of rural planning commissions per million inhabitants www.indiastat.com 164007 8.53 5.32
Chapter 3
D ecoding the Code o f Civil 
Procedure: Explaining Variations in  
the Speed o f the Judiciary Across 
States and Years in India.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will examine India’s Code of Civil Procedure in order to explain why its 
judiciary is so congested. I read and classified the 430 amendments to the Code of Civil 
Procedure enacted by High Courts between 1971 and 1996. In particular, I find that the 
94 amendments complexifying procedures that have to be followed by the Courts (sub­
sequently named “Court red tape” amendments), not explicitly designed to deteriorate 
speed, significantly increase expected duration of trials in High Courts. I also read and 
classified all conflicting judicial decisions taken by High Courts between 1971 and 1996. 
I find that conflicting judicial decisions, in other words violations of precedents already
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established by High Courts, increase trial duration as judges are required to spend con­
siderable time in choosing between several conflicting views. I then use these “Court red 
tape” amendments, not explicitly designed to deteriorate speed, and conflicting decisions, 
which, I will argue, are temporally exogenous, as instrumental variables for the expected 
duration of trials in order to measure the impact of judicial slowness on economic perfor­
mance. I find that slower judiciaries reduce access to credit markets in the agricultural 
sector, leading to depressed agricultural outputs.
The judiciary is a topic of first-order importance. In India, the speed of the judiciary 
has been identified as a key problem. Data on cases pending in courts indicate that 
there were 3.1 million cases pending in 21 High Courts and 2 0  million in subordinate 
courts in 20001. Extreme examples of judicial slowness refer to cases taking 47 years to 
be resolved, by which time the plaintiff had died. Slow judiciaries could heavily shape 
economic activity. First, slow judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behavior 
of borrowers: anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans quickly 
via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default. Creditors respond to this strategic 
behavior of borrowers by reducing the availability of credit. Second, the probability of 
harsh punishment in monetary or non-monetary terms heavily dissuades opportunistic 
agents to default ex-post on previous agreements. Slower judiciaries make the discounted 
value of punishment lower, thereby weakening incentives to cooperate. For example, if 
a firm wants to undertake an investment in order to supply another with a particular 
asset, the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior by the partner arises 
once the investment costs are sunk. A speedy judicial system enforcing contracts swiftly 
could limit post-contractual opportunistic behavior and foster investment. It is therefore 
important to know why the judiciary is so slow in India.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of institutions on
1 Law’s Delays: Arrears in Courts, 85th Report, Department-related parliamentary standing commit­
tee on Home affairs, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha. http://rajyasabha.nic.in/ 
book2/reports/home_aff/85threport%20.htm
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economic performance. One key question in this literature is causation, because insti­
tutions axe arguably endogenous. There are some successful attempts at resolving the 
endogeneity and causality issues (Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al, 
2001).
To open the black box of “institutions”, I focus in this paper on the judiciary, in 
particular its speed, which has been identified in India as one of its key problem. The 
literature often exploits spatial variation in the quality of the judiciary to identify its 
effect on economic activity. Knack and Keefer (1995) relate professional country risk 
measures provided by business experts to their measure of judicial quality which is the 
amount of contract-intensive money (the difference between M2 and cash). However, 
it might be, for example, that states that have in general better policies are also more 
inclined to have efficient judiciaries. But if that is the case, judicial quality just reflects 
the general better economic policies and in itself may not be important in driving better 
economic outcomes.
Djankov et al. (2003) have made an important contribution to the study of courts. 
They measure judicial formalism in 109 countries around the world. They find that judi­
cial formalism is greater in civil law than in common law countries and greater formalism 
is associated with less consistency, less honesty, and less fairness in judicial decisions. 
Endogeneity concerns are addressed by using legal origin as an instrument for judicial 
formalism. This paper differs in three ways. First, in contrast to Djankov et al. (2003), 
this paper uses a within-country analysis of India. By working within a single country, 
I am able to control for a range of factors and influences that cannot be as convincingly 
controlled for in cross country data. This allows one to identify the effect of judicial 
efficiency separately from that of laws, legal origin, and other country-wide characteris­
tics. Second, the other difference to Djankov et al. (2003) is that the focus in my paper 
is on economic, not only judicial, outcomes. Third, this paper generates cleax policy 
implications about the desirability of a Code of Civil Procedure reform.
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Jappelli et al (2005) present a model of the effect of judicial enforcement on credit 
markets and then test it using panel data from Italian provinces. The authors find, among 
other things, that the duration of civil trials (measured by actual duration in the past) 
as well as the stock of pending civil trials per inhabitant are negatively correlated with 
loans granted to domestic companies and positively correlated with measures of credit 
constraints. Cristini et al (2001) relate differences injudicial efficiency across Argentinean 
provinces to the size of provincial credit markets. Castelar Pinheiro et al (2001) perform 
a similar analysis in Brazil. In these three papers, no attempt is made to deal with the 
potential endogeneity of the judicial inefficiency measures.
In contrast, in this paper, I focus on procedural complexity and ambiguity as two 
potential reasons for the slowness of Courts in India. I then exploit the spatial and 
temporal variation of “Court red tape” amendments and conflicting judicial decisions to 
instrument the impact of expected duration of a trial in High Court on economic activity. 
I do not claim that “Court red tape” amendments and conflicting judicial decisions are 
exogenous. However, there are several reasons as to why these variables could represent 
good instrumental variables. First, “Court red tape” amendments were not explicitly 
designed to deteriorate the speed of Courts. As such, they were not endogenous to the 
judicial slowness at the time the amendment was passed. Other amendments, clearly 
endogenous because explicitely stating speedy disposal of cases are not considered (and 
shown to be indeed endogenous with overidentification tests). Second, I will argue that 
the temporal variation in conflicting judicial decisions is exogenous as they arise after 
the arbitrary occurrence of cases pertaining to ambiguous sections of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Third, I use a panel data analysis and include State fixed effects to account for 
permanent differences across States in policies and outcomes. If systematic determinants 
of amendments are time invariant characteristics, then this will remove concerns about 
endogeneity. Fourth, I try to account for forces leading to amendments enactment by 
looking at the political influence of parties in determining amendments and at the political
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representation of certain groups likely to influence amendments.
The paper is structured as follows, section 3.2 describes data collected concerning 
amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure between 1971 and 1996 and conflicting 
decisions made by High Courts, section 3.3 focuses on theoretical issues, explaining 
both the reasons behind these amendments and the potential impact of the judiciary on 
economic activity. This section clarifies the econometric specification used by specifying 
what control variables and what economic outcomes should be used, section 3.4 contains 
an empirical analysis of the effects of both amendments and conflicting decisions on the 
expected duration of High Court trials, section 3.5 examines the effects of the judiciary 
on economic outcomes, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 D ata
Judicial institutions are the same across courts and States. The Indian judiciary operates 
on three levels: a single Supreme Court at the federal level; High Courts in each of the 
States; and, at lower levels, district judges for civil cases and session judges for criminal 
cases. Speed has been identified as a key problem. Data on cases pending in courts 
indicate that there were 3.1 million cases pending in 21  High Courts and 20 million in 
subordinate courts in 20002. Examples of judicial slowness are striking:
“the highest court in the country, the Supreme Court, took 11 years to 
acquit the headmaster of a school on the charge of taking a bribe for signing 
the salary arrears bill of his school. In another case of judicial delay, the 
victim was former Union Law Minister, Dr. B.R.Ambedkar. The judgement 
came in his lifetime but it took 47 years for the Maharashtra government to
2Law’s Delays: Arrears in Courts, 85th Report, Department-related parliamentary standing commit­
tee on Home affairs, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha. http://rajyasabha.nic.in/ 
book2 /  reports/home_aff/85threport%20.htm
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execute the decree passed in his favour against illegal encroachment of his 
land by Pakistani refugees. By then he was dead.3”
Legal experts argue that the Code of Civil Procedure is a major reason why India’s 
judiciary is so slow. To prove this, I will analyze how State amendments to the Code 
affect the expected durations of High Court trials. I will also use the 144th Report on 
“Conflicting Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” in order 
to understand when and which High Courts violated their own precedents. This may 
have the effect of increasing expected durations of High Court trials.
3.2.1 Am endm ents to  the Code o f Civil Procedure
The Code of Civil Procedure (1908) contains India’s laws relating to procedures in suits 
and civil proceedings. They may be summed up as follows: procedures for filing civil 
cases, court powers for passing various orders, court fees and stamps involved in the filing 
of cases, rights of the parties to cases, namely plaintiff and defendant, jurisdictions and 
parameters within which civil courts must function, specific rules for case proceedings, 
right of appeals, reviews and references. The Code has been amended from time to time 
by various Acts of Central and State Legislatures. The Code is divided into two parts, 
namely Sections and Orders. While the main principles are contained in the former, the 
detailed procedures with regard to matters dealt with by the Sections are spelled out 
in the latter. According to Section 1 2 2 , High Courts have power to amend, by rules, 
procedures laid down by the Orders. These High Court amendments set precedents for 
the entire State since India functions according to the common law system—the actions 
of High Court judges set precedents for the functioning of subordinate courts in their 
particular State. The exercise of these powers has brought 430 amendments to the Orders 
by various High Courts since 1968. I read each of these amendments and classified them
3Krishnamoorty, Dasu, Judicial Delays, Indolink, editorial analysis, 2003
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according to three broad categories: “explicit speed” amendments designed to favour 
expeditious justice, “Court red tape” amendments which add procedures to be followed 
by the Court, and “speed” amendments likely to have an effect on speed by whatever 
means4. Table 3.1 defines each amendment category and presents a number of descriptive 
statistics. I will now provide examples for each of these three categories.
The most obvious amendments likely to affect speed are those that explicitly spell 
out some notion of time limitation. These will be called "explicit speed" amendments. 
Consider Order 9—Appearance of Parties and Consequences of Non-Appearance, Rule 5 
of the Civil Procedure Code:
“Dism issal of su it w here plaintiff, a fte r sum m ons re tu rn ed  un ­
served, fails for one m onth  to  apply  for fresh sum m ons .-Where, after 
a summons has been issued to the defendant, or to one of several defendants, 
and returned unserved, the plaintiff fails, for a period of one month from the 
date of the return made to the Court by the officer certifying to the Court 
returns made by the serving officers, to apply for the issue of a fresh sum­
mons the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed as against 
such defendant, unless [...]”
Compare it with the Bombay High Court amendment enacted in 1987:
“Dism issal of su it w here plaintiff, a fte r sum m ons re tu rn ed  un­
served, fails for tw o  m o n th s  to  apply  for fresh summons.-Where, after 
a summons has been issued to the defendant, or to one of several defendants,
4‘Speed amendments’ include the ‘explicit speed’ and ‘Court red tape amendments’. They also include 
‘defendant red tape’ (adding procedures to the defendant which slow things down), ‘poor’ (explicitly pro- 
poor amendments which increase incentives for the poor to file cases and thus delay overall judicial speed), 
‘agricultural’ (explicitly pro-agricultural), ‘business’ (explicitly pro-business), ‘government’ (explicitly 
pro-government), ‘judgement-debtor’ (explicitly pro-judgement debtor), ‘demand-side solution’ (which 
reduce incentive to file cases and thus unburden the judiciary), ‘plaintiff red tape’, and ‘certainty’ (which 
increase the certainty of an outcome and thus increase incentives to file cases).
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and returned unserved, the plaintiff fails, for a period of two months from the 
date of the return made to the Court by the officer certifying to the Court 
returns made by the serving officers, to apply for the issue of a fresh sum­
mons the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed as against 
such defendant, unless [...]”
I have italicized the difference between the two amendments. This difference could 
potentially affect case backlog. It implies that, in India, a case is dismissed after one 
month if the plaintiff fails to apply for a fresh summons once a defendant summons returns 
unserved. However, in the Bombay High Court, and consequently in all Maharashtra 
courts, cases are dismissed after only two months. This may have slowed down case 
dismissal in Maharashtra State after 1987. I therefore classify this amendment as a -1  
in the “explicit speed” variable forever after 1987 for Maharashtra5. There have been 
50 such amendments in India between 1971 and 1996. These can be seen in Table 3.1, 
Column (1 ) (Column (2 ) presents the sum of the amendments weighted by their direction, 
Column (3) presents the ratio of the weighted sum by the total number of amendments: 
“explicit speed” amendments in India generally favour the shortening of procedures). It 
is also worth noting that the time limit imposed in this particular example cannot be 
modified or extended by courts. I noted “explicit speed” amendments where provisions 
state that a court may extend a time limit if it wishes to do so. This is important because 
it is often said that any amendment is inefficient if it goes against the habits of the court 
and if the latter retains the possibility of modifying time limits on a case by case basis. 
There are 42 explicit speed amendments where discretion regarding time limits is left to
5 It is interesting to note that this one month period was originally three before a pan-India amendment 
in 1976. It was later changed in 1999 in another pan-India amendment to just 7 days! The 1999 
amendment had the explicit objective of facilitating the swift disposal of civil suits and proceedings. I 
will not study these amendments since I include year fixed effects in my panel data analysis in order 
to account for any common macroeconomic shocks at the national level. However, the fact that this 
duration was modified in 1999 would seem to indicate that this order is of particular importance in 
determining judicial speed.
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the courts. It is important to keep this in mind when evaluating the impact of these 
amendments.
More subtle amendments will also have an effect on speed. The second category of 
amendments concerns procedures courts must follow. Consider Order 39—Temporary 
Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders, Rule 4:
“Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.-
Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside, by the 
Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order
Compare this with the Madhya Pradesh High Court amendment enacted in 1984:
“Order for injunction m ay be discharged, varied or set aside.-
Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside, by the 
Court for reasons to be recorded, either on its own motion or on application 
made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order [...].”
Reasons for putting aside an injunction must be recorded in Madhya Pradesh after 
1984. This slows down the courts. I therefore classify this amendment as a +1 in the 
“court red tape” variable from 1984 onward for Madhya Pradesh and expect a positive 
correlation with the expected duration of High Court trials. There have been 94 such 
amendments in India between 1971 and 1996 (see Figure 3.1 for a graph of these “court 
red tape” amendments by State and year).
The final category concerns “speed” amendments. This category includes any amend­
ments having an effect on speed. It includes “explicit speed” amendments, likely to in­
crease speed, and “Court red tape” and “Defendant red tape” amendments, likely to 
decrease speed. The latter are amendments that add procedures for the defendants. 
Consider Order 21—Execution of Decrees and Orders, Rule 2 , Sub-Rule 2 :
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“Paym ent out o f Court to  decree-holder.- (2) The judgement-debtor 
or any person who has become surety for the judgement-debtor may also 
inform the court of such payment or adjustment [...].”
Compare this with the Bombay High Court amendment of 1983:
“Paym ent out o f Court to  decree-holder.- (2) The judgement-debtor 
or any person who has become surety for the judgement-debtor may also 
inform the court by an application in writing supported by an affidavit of 
such payment or adjustment
This type of amendment increases the defendant’s procedural burden and is likely to 
increase the duration of High Court trials. I therefore classify it as a + 1  in the “defendant 
red tape” variable from 1983 onward for Maharashtra and expect a positive correlation 
with the expected duration of High Court trials.
Other amendments may decrease judicial speed by affecting the demand-side of the 
judiciary. In fact, some amendments are likely to affect litigants’ willingness to go to 
court. This in turn affects case backlog and thus overall judicial speed. I classify these 
demand-side amendments in eight different categories according to sections of the popu­
lation they are likely to affect. I call them: “poor” , “agricultural” , “business” “govern­
ment” , “judgment-debtor”, “demand-side solution” , “plaintiff red tape” and “certainty”. 
Table 3.1 provides a definition of each as well as some descriptive statistics. Data Ap­
pendix 1 provides examples of such amendments. “Speed” amendments are the sum of 
these eight categories and “explicit speed”, “Court red tape” and “Defendant red tape” 
amendments.
This allows me to define a final category: “implicit speed” amendments equal to 
the difference between “speed” and “explicit speed” amendments. There have been 288 
amendments of this type in India between 1971 and 1996 (see Figure 3.2 for a graph of 
these "implicit speed" amendments by State and year).
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The distinction between “explicit” and “implicit speed” amendments is important. 
As Besley and Case (2000) has shown, if high court amendment making is a purposeful 
action, one responsive to economic, political or even judicial conditions within the State, 
then it is necessary to identify and account for the forces leading to these amendments. 
A State enacting “explicit speed” amendments may well be considered more “advanced”. 
And being more “advanced” , it will also have better economic performance. This leads to 
a spurious correlation between “explicit speed” amendments and economic performance 
arising from unobserved State heterogeneity. “Explicit speed” amendments are clearly 
endogenous responses to particular problems. In contrast, “implicit speed” amendments 
are not by definition explicitly designed to increase speed. They should be preferred over 
the former.
In this section, I have isolated four amendment types likely to affect judicial speed: 
the “explicit speed”, “court red tape”, “speed” amendments and by extension, “implicit 
speed” amendments. Data Appendix 2 describes Allahabad State’s complete amendment 
history, providing an overall view of the codification.6.
I have codified here each and every amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure from 
1971 to 1996. I will now focus on another potential reason why courts are slow in India: 
the conflicting decisions of High Courts. The latter’s spatial and temporal occurrence 
allows me to isolate the impact of the Code’s ambiguity on judicial speed.
3.2.2 Conflicting judicial decisions
Legal experts have long argued that ambiguity in Indian law increases delays in case 
treatment. For example, the Indian Law Commission’s 136th report entitled “Conflicts 
in High Courts decisions on central laws—how to foreclose and how to resolve’ states 
that “those who are entrusted with the function of adjudicating on questions of law
6Only ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit speed’, ‘court red tape’, and ‘defendant red tape’ are included. ‘Speed 
court’ is equal to ‘explicit speed’ if the court itself is in a position to set time limits. Other types of 
amendments included in ‘speed’ and ‘implicit speed’ axe not presented.
67
must spend considerable time in choosing between two or more possible views on a 
subject which falls to be considered before them’7. This is also true for the Code of 
Civil Procedure. This code is so ambiguous that opposite decisions on similar cases have 
been reached in different High Courts. An even worse problem is when the same High 
Court arrives at opposite verdicts on similar cases at different times. The underlying 
intuition is that, after a violation of its own precedent by a High Court, judges have no 
choice but to spend considerable time on choosing between two or more possible views 
on the subject at hand. Studying every such violation in the period from 1971 to 1996 
has allowed me to relate, in the empirical section, their occurrence in certain States at 
certain times to the expected duration of High Court trials in view of seeing whether or 
not conflicting judicial decisions caused by the Civil Procedure Code’s ambiguity may 
explain the country’s slow judiciary.
The occurrence of conflicting judicial decisions could have another effect on the ju­
diciary. As the Law Commission of India’s 136th report states, “those whose business 
is to advise persons who consult them on questions of law, find it difficult to give such 
advice with confidence where the decisions are conflicting”8. In other words, such High 
Court reversals may lead to increased uncertainty in case outcome. This might decrease 
litigants’ willingness to file cases and thereby increase judicial speed. The net impact of 
conflicting judicial decisions on the expected duration of a High Court trial is therefore 
an empirical question. The empirical section of this paper will relate the occurrence of 
the same High Court precedent violations to the expected duration of High Court trials. 
I will now describe the data collected.
The Law Commission of India published in 1992 its 144th report on “Conflicting
7p. 1, “Conflicts in High Courts decisions on central laws-how to foreclose and how to resolve”, Law 
Commission of India’s 136th report, 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/101-169/Reportl36.pdf
8p. 1, “Conflicts in High Courts decisions on central laws-how to foreclose and how to resolve”, Law 
Commission of India’s 136th report, 
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/101-169/Reportl36.pdf
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Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908’ by K.N. Singh, India’s 
Chief Justice from 25.11.1991 to 12.12.1991. This report summarises conflicting decisions 
made by High Courts arising from ambiguity and lack of clarity in the Civil Procedure 
Code. It presents a total of 30 different Code rules having led to opposite decisions 
by different High Courts, succinctly describing the Code’s ambiguity and listing each 
High Court’s opposing view. It includes 163 opposing decisions by different High Courts 
involving these 30 rules (see Figure 3.3 for a graph of all the decisions taken by High 
Court violating (+ 1) or confirming (-1) prior judgements). In the following example I 
will consider an extreme case in which a High Court contradicted itself in two different 
cases based on the same point of law.
Order 23, Rule 1(3) allows for the withdrawal of suits with liberty to file fresh suits 
under certain circumstances, namely “formal defect” or “sufficient grounds”. The ques­
tion here is whether or not the rule applies in cases of partial or total suit abatement, 
that is, on the death of a party. Ambiguity is caused by another rule which explicitly 
mentions the death of a party. Order 22—Death, Marriage and Insolvency of Parties— 
Rule 4 states that in the case of the death of a sole defendant, or in the case of the death 
of one of several defendants and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving 
defendant, then the Court, on an application made on behalf of the dead party, shall 
cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall 
proceed with the suit. However, if no application is made, the suit shall abate as against 
the deceased defendant. Rule 9 further states that where a suit abates under this order, 
no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action. Therefore, allowing the plain­
tiff to withdraw in such circumstances and file a fresh suit would allow him to bypass 
Order 2 2 . This was the view taken in a 1936 Calcutta Case9. In the latter, a suit was 
directed against the sole dependant for possession. On his death, his legal representatives 
were not substituted and, consequently, the suit abated. Withdrawal was not permitted.
9Ramesh v Deo Mehar Bibi, 40 CWN 1019 (RC Mitter J.)
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However, in a later 1953 Calcutta Case10, a leave to withdraw was granted in a case where 
the suit abated upon the death of one co-trespasser. Nevertheless, the view taken in 1936 
reappeared later in a 1984 case11. It is worth noting that K.N. Singh (ex-Chief Justice 
of India and author of the report) recommended clarifying the code in such a way that 
the death of a party would not constitute grounds for withdrawal. This recommendation 
was never introduced and the ambiguity remains to this day.
I argue that High Court reversals such as these increase the likelihood of longer case 
durations. In fact, in cases where the defendant dies, judges are required to carefully 
consider not only Order 23, Rule 1(3), Order 22—Death, Marriage and Insolvency of 
Parties—Rule 4 and Rule 9, but also the following precedents: the 1936 Calcutta Case: 
Ramesh v Deo Mehar Bibi, 40 CWN 1019 (RC Mitter J.); the 1953 Calcutta Case: Hakir 
Mahamed v Abdul Majid, AIR 1953 Cal 588, para 3; and the 1984 Calcutta Case: Shyam 
Ray v Harnam De, AIR 1984 Cal 67, 70 para 1 2 . Because Singh’s recommendation was 
not adopted, coming to a decision is all the more difficult. In this case, I increment by 
1, from 1984 on in West Bengal, a “violation of a precedent established by the same 
High Court’ variable. I also subtract it by 1 when a decision taken in a case is confirmed 
explicitly by another later case. There have been 24 such occurrences in India’s States 
between 1971 and 1996 (see Figure 3.4 for the graph of this variable per state per year). 
I expect to see a positive correlation with the expected duration of High Court trials.
The crucial feature of the analysis is the temporally arbitrary occurrence of this am­
biguous case. In this particular example, the “violation of a precedent established by the 
same High Court” variable takes the value 1 in 1984 in West Bengal due to the occur­
rence of a death of one party in a case in 1984 and the subsequent necessity to use Orders 
22  and 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In contrast with the amendments strategy 
followed earlier, the temporal variation in the “violation of a precedent established by 
the same High Court” variable is not endogenous to the economic, political or judiciary’s
10Hakir Mahamed v Abdul Majid, AIR 1953 Cal 588, para 3
11 Shyam Ray v Harnam De, AIR 1984 Cal 67, 70 para 12.
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conditions, but is rather due to the arbitrary occurrence of cases pertaining to ambiguous 
sections of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Spatial variation in this variable is not necessarily random. The fact that judges 
contradict precedents previously established by their own High Court is perhaps merely 
a reflection of their ability. The “violation of a precedent established by the same High 
Court” could simply be a measure of a High Court’s quality. An empirical analysis 
relating this variable to the expected duration of a trial in High Court could possibly 
confuse the Code of Civil Procedure’s ambiguity with the quality of a particular court. 
I therefore control for the quality or level of competence of a particular court in my 
empirical analysis.
This section has isolated two determinants of judicial speed: Civil Procedure Code 
amendments likely to affect expected durations of trials (“explicit speed” , “Court red 
tape” , “speed” and “implicit speed” amendments) and conflicting decisions. I will now 
discuss possible endogeneity concerns arising from these two determinants as well as the 
expected impact of the judiciary on economic activity.
3.3 Theory
This paper attempts to find the causes of judicial inefficiency in India. I have identified 
94 “Court red tape” amendments and 24 conflicting judicial decisions between 1971 and 
1996 which could affect the expected duration of a trial in High Court.
The paper’s second objective is to relate the judiciary’s speed to economic perfor­
mance. Cross section analysis is not appropriate in answering such a question since un­
observed State heterogeneity might influence the results. I employ a panel data analysis 
dealing with unobserved time constant State heterogeneity. There might still, however, 
be unobserved time variant State heterogeneity. One response to this problem would 
find exogenous sources of variation in the quality of the judiciary. This would allow for 
a causal interpretation of judicial quality on economic outcomes. This paper seeks to
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locate sources of variation in the speed of the judiciary. Immediately after a “Court red 
tape” amendment or a “violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” in 
a particular State, I expect the duration of a High Court trial to increase and thus eco­
nomic performance to be affected. This is the instrumental variable approach intuition, 
one in which “Court red tape” amendments and “violation of a precedent established 
by the same High Court” are instrumental variables for the expected duration of High 
Court trials in a regression on economic performance.
Two questions remain. First, one instrumental variable approach assumption is that 
instruments must be exogenous. I do not claim that “Court red tape” amendments or 
a “violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” are exogenous. I will 
try in this section to analyze reasons why such amendments or violations occur. This 
is important because we need to account for the forces leading to these amendments or 
violations in the econometric specifications [Besley et al, 2000]. Second, I need to clarify 
exactly what economic outcomes are likely to be influenced by the judiciary; just what 
are the mechanisms through which the judiciary affects economic activity. I will now 
attempt to answer these two questions.
3.3.1 Endogeneity o f the am endm ents
The paper uses spatial and temporal variation in amendments afforded by the Indian 
federal system to estimate the impact of amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure on 
the judiciary’s outcomes. However, time-varying State level amendments can be stud­
ied as either left or right hand side variables. These amendments may be responsive 
to economic, political or judicial conditions within the State. It is necessary to iden­
tify and account for the forces behind Civil Procedure Code amendments if we are to 
obtain unbiased estimates of these amendments’ impact. For example, “explicit speed” 
amendments are obviously responsive to judicial conditions. Amendments with the ex­
plicit objective of delaying reduction are surely enacted to solve this problem. For this
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reason, I will not consider in the paper’s regressions “explicit speed” amendments. On 
the other hand, “Court red tape” amendments may be considered less endogenous to 
judicial delays. “Court red tape” amendments do not explicitly posit delay reduction 
as an objective. But the latter may still be responsive to economic, political or judicial 
conditions within the State. Consequently, it is necessary to study who enacts these 
amendments. Under Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, High Courts have the 
power to amend, by rules, procedures laid down in the Orders. No political interference 
in decision making is expected in theory; however, considering the tumultuous relations 
between India’s Executive and Judiciary, this assumption seems unreasonable. Political 
parties and sensitivities in each State influence the making of amendments. It is par­
ticularly instructive to examine the history of conflicts between Executive and Judiciary 
between 1971 and 1996, and in particular the history of judge appointment, in order to 
determine the degree of independence enjoyed by decision-making courts. To do this, I 
will borrow from Bhagwan D. Dua’s survey in "A Study in Executive-Judicial Conflict: 
The Indian Case".
In the 1970s, India’s judiciary was free from any political interference. In June 1975, 
Allahabad’s High Court found the Prime Minister guilty of electoral fraud and ordered her 
removed from Parliament and banned from running for an additional six years. Instead 
of confronting the charges, Mrs. Gandhi declared a State of Emergency and launched 
a massive crackdown on civil liberties and political opposition. Judges then began to 
interpret the Constitution in light of the new political climate.
The Janata Interregnum (1977-79) attempted to restore to judges some degree of 
self-confidence. The government cancelled Mrs. Gandhi’s mass transfer of High Court 
judges in order to emphasize that the Constitution was not in the business of punitive 
transfers (i.e. transfers without consultation of India’s Chief Justice) of judges.
However, the return to power of the Congress (I) Party in 1980 revived memories of 
the Emergency regime. Mrs. Gandhi has often viewed the courts as centres of political
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opposition and in 1981 bluntly called into question the judicial integrity of the Janata- 
appointed judges12. Chief Justice Chandrachud complained that:
“Since the Executive is controlled by political leaders...it may, it is feared, 
transfer a judge to a far-off place like Sikkim, the Andaman Islands or Assam, 
or refuse to grant him further extension if he does not toe the line”13.
Due to internal dissension, the Supreme Court undermined in the same year its in­
dependence in the Judges’ Transfer Case, in which the majority of a seven-judge Consti­
tutional Bench offered the government carte blanche to hire Supreme Court judges, fire 
temporary judges and transfer (except on a mass scale) High Court judges without the 
consent of India’s Chief Justice. In other words, Mrs. Gandhi was given a free hand to 
manage the judiciary as she liked.
In 1993, the policy of transferring judges without consent was abandoned following 
the Second Judges’ case. The Supreme Court introduced the concept of the primacy of 
the Chief Justice of India in matters of recommending persons for appointment to the 
higher judiciary14.
To conclude this short survey, I expect political parties to influence the passing of 
various amendments. However, political interference was limited to certain periods and 
parties. I measure a State’s political inclination by the proportion of seats won in Legisla­
tive Assemblies by four different party groupings: the Congress Party (Indian National 
Congress, Indian Congress Socialist, Indian National Congress Urs), a hard left grouping 
(Communist Party of India, Communist Party of India Marxist), a soft left grouping (So­
cialist Party, Praja Socialist Party), and Hindu parties (Bhartiya Janata Party, Bhartiya 
Jana Sangh). I include these terms in the regressions and also interact these variables 
with an all-India dummy at value 1 in cases where political interference is expected,
12 India Today, January 31, 1982, p.62
13 Statesm an weekly, May 2, 1981.
14 Frontline, A flawed mechanism, ZV.Venkatesan, 06/06/2003.
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such as during the Emergency Regime (1975-77) and during the years 1981-93 when the 
First Judges’ case was prevalent (described in Figure V). I include the political variables 
interacted with this dummy as control variables in all the regressions in order to remove 
bias resulting from omission of these variables.
Another possibility is that certain groups not divided along party lines but sharing 
common interests might succeed in influencing the judiciary. An intuitive hypothesis 
would posit the influence of scheduled castes and tribes in the Legislative Assemblies 
on the judiciary which favoured their particular groupings. The suggestion that such 
castes and tribes would strive to improve access to justice for poorer sections of the 
society would appear intuitive. I therefore expect “Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes in Legislative Assemblies” to exert pressure on courts in regards to demand-side 
amendments favouring judicial access. There is growing evidence suggesting that seat 
reservation affects public goods allocation in a way that favours the group benefiting from 
the reservation. Pande [2003] found that reservations of seats for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes in State Legislative Assemblies led to increased transfers towards these 
groups. After accounting for the direct impact of the fraction of the population that com­
prises a State’s Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, a 1% rise in the fraction of seats 
reserved to Scheduled Castes in State Legislature is associated with a 0.6% increase in 
job quotas for Scheduled Castes. A 1% rise in the fraction of seats reserved for Scheduled 
Tribes in State Legislatures is associated with an increase of 0.8 percentage points in the 
share of total State spending devoted to welfare programs targeted to Scheduled Tribes. 
At the Panchayat level, Besley et al. [2004] found that reservation of leadership positions 
for a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe increases—by about 7 percentage points—the 
likelihood that a Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes village household has access to 
toilets, electricity connections or private water connections via government schemes. I 
have thus included the proportion of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes as well as the group’s population share according to government census following
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Pande [2003].
This section shows that the composition of executive power and Scheduled Castes/ 
Scheduled Tribes representation must be accounted for in all regressions because the 
judiciary is not free, during certain periods, from political interference affecting the en­
actment of amendments. The second question of how the Judiciary affects economic 
activity remains.
3.3.2 A m odel for the Judiciary
There is increasing evidence suggesting that court system efficiency is important to well- 
functioning economies. Slow judiciaries increase costs of accessing legal systems and 
favour those with more extra-legal bargaining power. There are two key areas where 
courts may play a role in India: credit markets (difficulties in repaying loans) and con­
tract enforcement. I expect legal system inefficiency to contribute to poor conditions for 
society’s most vulnerable as well as for its most intensive users of the judiciary. For exam­
ple, I expect the poor (society’s most vulnerable) and creditors (as opposed to debtors) 
I will now describe the mechanisms through which the judiciary affects credit markets 
and firms’ contracting behavior.
Judicial systems influence firms’ debt contracts. As Pagano et al [2002] explain:
“The key function of courts in credit relationships is to force solvent bor­
rowers to repay when they fail to do so spontaneously. By the same token, 
poor judicial enforcement increases the opportunistic behavior of borrowers: 
anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans easily and 
cheaply via courts, borrowers will be more tempted to default. Creditors re­
spond to this strategic behavior of borrowers by reducing the availability of 
credit.”
The authors develop a model in which collateral is used as a device to solve credit rar 
tioning. They find that improved judicial efficiency reduces credit rationing and expands
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lending. One should expect inefficient judiciaries to disproportionately affect sections of 
society unable to provide collateral. I will test this theoretical implication by examining 
the situation of farmers, who typically comprise the poor in India.
The second intuitive consequence of an imperfect judiciary is the modification of eco­
nomic agents’ willingness to cooperate in previously signed contracts. We know that 
judiciaries act as important deterrents to fraud that might be more economically attrac­
tive in the short run. The probability of harsh punishment in monetary or non-monetary 
terms would heavily dissuade opportunistic agents to default ex-post on previous agree­
ments.
One could also expect the quality of judiciaries to impact on investments undertaken 
by the firm. I consider the case where a firm would undertake an investment in order 
to supply another with a particular asset. However, as Klein et al (1978) emphasized, 
the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior arises. Indeed, to induce the 
supplier to undertake an investment, a firm can either write a long-term contract with 
favorable terms for the supplier or guarantee exclusivity rights. But once the costs of 
the investment are sunk, there is an immediate incentive for the firm to renege on the 
contract and capture the suppliers’ rents. Alternatively, if search costs to find a new 
supplier are high, there is an immediate incentive for the supplier to use its monopoly 
power to impose higher prices. These frictions could reduce the incentive to invest; Klein 
et al (1978) conclude that vertical integration will supersede market systems in such 
cases. But another way to limit post-contractual opportunistic behavior is a speedy 
judicial system that enforces contracts swiftly. This shows that judiciaries should affect 
the economic performance of contract-intensive activities. I will test this implication by 
examining investment by farmers, a section of society likely to be affected by inefficient 
judiciaries as they lack extra-legal bargaining power.
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3.4 M ethods and Results
This section will relate both amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure and conflicting 
decisions to judicial functioning. I expect “Court red tape” amendments ( which modify 
procedures to be followed by the courts), the “speed” and “implicit speed” amendments 
(which are likely to affect proceeding duration but not purposefully enacted to solve the 
pendency problem) 15 to be related to the expected duration of a trial in High Court. I 
also expect the “violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” (a High 
Court decision violating an earlier decision by the same High Court because of ambiguity 
in the Code of Civil Procedure) to have an effect on this expected duration of a trial in 
High Court. It is noteworthy that this section is in fact the first stage of an Instrumental 
Variable estimation of the impact of the judiciary on economic activity. In the next 
section I will relate judicial functioning to economic activity using these amendments 
and conflicting decisions as Instrumental Variables.
In this section, the outcome of interest is the expected duration of a trial in High Court 
(duratioriit). It is equal to the number of pending cases plus the number of filed cases 
within the year divided by the number of cases disposed of within the year. This duration 
is measured in years. Figure 3.6 shows the graph of this variable in 25 states between 
1971 and 1996. To relate amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure (am endm entsit) 
and “violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” (violation^) to the 
expected duration of a trial in High Court, I perform regressions of the form:
duratioriit =  cti +  0 t +  7  amendmentsit +  dviolationa +  Oxu +  un (3.1)
where i corresponds to a state, t to time. are state fixed effects, (3t time fixed effects. xit 
are control variables. These Xu will include incrementally the ratio of dismissed appeals
151 do not consider “explicit speed” amendments as they are purposefully designed to reduce delays 
and are therefore responsive to the judiciary’s conditions at the time.
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to total appeals from the respective high court. This variable determines the probability 
that a High Court decides correctly. The underlying assumption here is that the Supreme 
Court is not biased and it is not subject to errors, and that the majority of the cases 
are appealed. This is therefore a measure of the quality of courts and an important 
variable to take into account in order to isolate the impact of ambiguity in the Code of 
Civil Procedure with violationit and not only the impact of court quality. I also include 
political political controls: the proportion of seats won by Congress parties, hard left 
parties, soft left parties and Bharatiya Janta parties interacted with a dummy indicating 
when Legislative Assemblies are likely to influence judicial process16. I then include the 
proportion of seats reserved to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in State Legislative 
Assemblies interacted with a dummy indicating when Legislative Assemblies are likely to 
influence judicial process and the proportion of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in the 
population according to censuses, according to the reasoning developed in the theoretical 
section above. I include the number of Panchayats per million capita in the State to 
account for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as well as the proportion of total 
revenue expenditure spent on Organs of State lagged for two years to account for the 
budget devoted to judicial functioning. Uit is a disturbance term. As Figure 3.6 shows, 
the expected duration of trials is increasing over time in each and every state. To deal 
with this problem of autocorrelation, I cluster the standard errors by State (Bertrand et 
al, 2 0 0 2 )17. State fixed effects capture time-constant State-specific factors such as culture 
and geography. Year effects capture common shocks such as the central amendments to 
the Code of Civil Procedure that took place in 1976 (and in 1999 and 2 0 0 2 , though the 
latter two are not included in the observation sample from 1971 to 1996) as well as other 
centrally implemented policies. The coefficients of interest are 7  and 5.
161 also tried with the level terms not interacted with the dummy.
17I have also tried to include state-specific time trends. The results do not vary. I present the results 
with the standard errors clustered as this has been demonstrated in Bertrand et al (2002) as a better 
way to deal with serial correlation.
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Table 3.2 relates Civil Procedure Code amendments and conflicting judicial decisions 
to expected durations of High Court trials. In Column (1), the dependent variable is 
duratioriit. The only explanatory variables are “Court red tape” amendments and the 
"violation of a precedent established by the same High Court" variable. State fixed 
effects and year fixed effects are included. One extra “Court red tape” amendment in­
creases the expected duration of a trial in High Court by 3.3 days. This coefficient is 
statistically significant. It confirms the intuition that adding or complicating Court pro­
cedures increases delays. One extra violation of a precedent established by the same High 
Court will increase the expected duration of a trial in High Court by 18.8 days. This 
coefficient is statistically significant. It confirms the intuition that judges must spend 
more time in choosing between conflicting views when the same High Court violates its 
own precedents. However, the “violation of a precedent established by the same High 
Court” variable could very well be correlated with the quality of judges. I therefore in­
clude the ratio of dismissed appeals in Column (2 ). I also add political controls following 
the theoretical section, which highlighted the fact that “Court red tape” amendments 
are perhaps responsive to political conditions. I measure a State’s political inclination 
by the proportion of seats won in Legislative Assemblies by four different party group­
ings: the Congress Party (Indian National Congress, Indian Congress Socialist, Indian 
National Congress Urs), a hard left grouping (Communist Party of India, Communist 
Party of India Marxist), a soft left grouping (Socialist Party, Praja Socialist Party), and 
Bhartiya Janata Party. I further interact these variables with an all-India dummy tak­
ing a value 1 when I expect some political interference, such as during the Emergency 
Regime of 1975-77 and the years 1981-93, when the First Judges’ case was taking place 
(as described in Figure 3.5)18. The coefficients are very similar in Column (2 ). Another 
hypothesis is that increased representation of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in Leg­
islative Assemblies affects judicial quality as Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes push for
181 also included level terms, not interacted with the dummy, and the results were again similar.
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reforms disproportionately favouring their groups of origin. I included in Column (3) the 
proportion of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in State Legislative 
Assemblies interacted with a dummy indicating when the former are likely to influence 
the judicial process and the proportion of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in the pop­
ulation according censuses following Pande’s (2003) methodology. The coefficients are 
again very similar. In Column (4), I also include the number of Panchayats per million 
capita in the State to account for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In fact, 
it is often claimed that judicial systems have only limited impact on economies because 
people resort to alternative dispute resolution institutions, particularly to informal ones. 
Koehling (2002) describes one such informal Indian institution: the Panchayats. They 
play a crucial role in settling and avoiding rural disputes. Panchayats, with their limited 
judicial authority, are used to settle disputes about land usage, tenure and commons. As 
locally-bound institutions, they are highly efficient since they are familiar with village 
situations and litigants. As a result, their level of acceptance among the population is 
high. In cases of dispute resolutions, Panchayats can impose very limited sanctions, but 
the social pressure created by judgements serves as strong incentives to comply with 
judgements. I also include in Column (4) the proportion of total revenue expenditure 
spent on the Organs of State19 lagged two years in order to account for budgets devoted 
to judicial functioning. The coefficients remain similar. Other types of amendments 
could potentially affect the expected duration of a trial in High Court. In Column (5), 
I include “speed” amendments. The latter is a cumulative variable increased by 1 after 
any amendment likely to have an impact on the speed of the courts is passed. This 
variable includes explicit speed, court red tape, defendant red tape, judgement-debtor, 
demand-side solution, plaintiff red tape, and certainty amendments. There is no effect of 
this variable on the expected duration of a trial in High Court. In Column (6 ), I include 
“implicit speed” amendments. This variable is the difference between speed amendments
19This measure is not perfect as it encompasses the State budget for Executive and Legislative 
branches.
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and explicit speed amendments. I subtract “explicit speed” amendments because these 
amendments are clearly responsive to judicial conditions and are therefore endogenous 
to the expected duration of a case in trial. I do not argue that “Court red tape” amend­
ments axe any less endogenous, but at least they are not explicitly designed to reduce 
delays. Column (6 ) shows no significant impact of “implicit speed” amendments. I also 
included separately or together every different type of amendment and consistently found 
that only “Court red tape” amendments and “violation of a precedent established by the 
same High Court” were significant20. Column (4) is the preferred specification because 
it includes only significant amendments affecting duration and the most complete set of 
controls. It is interesting to note that the F-value of the F-test of the joint significance of 
“Court red tape” amendments and “violation of a precedent established by the same High 
Court” is 8.06 significant at 5 percent. This means that “Court red tape” amendments 
and “violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” affect significantly 
the expected duration of a trial in High Court.
To conclude this section, I found in the panel data analysis that “Court red tape” 
amendments and “violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” were 
significant determinants of the expected duration of High Court trials. This confirms the 
intuition presented in the theoretical section. It is still possible to say, following Besley 
and Case (2 0 0 0 ), that time-varying State level amendments can be studied as either left 
or right hand side variables. These amendments are possibly responsive to economic, 
political or judicial conditions within the State. I address this concern in four ways.
First, I account for this matter in selecting amendments by considering only “Court 
red tape” or “implicit speed” amendments. “Explicit speed” amendments are clearly 
enacted in places suffering from slow judiciaries (replacing “Court red tape” amendments 
with “explicit speed” amendments in Table 3.2 produces an insignificant result, consistent 
with the reverse causality hypothesis). I argue that “Court red tape” amendments are not
20results not presented for claxity.
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explicitly related to speed. However, amendments whose primary aim is the improvement 
of procedure quality will have an indirect effect on speed. Second, I use a panel data 
analysis and include State fixed effects to account for permanent differences across States 
in policies and outcomes. If systematic determinants of amendments are time invariant 
characteristics, then this will remove concerns about endogeneity. Third, I try to account 
for forces leading to amendments enactment. As we saw in the theory section, the 
judiciary has not been free from political interference. I include variables measuring 
political inclination of States in these regressions. Fourth, this concern is less valid for 
“violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” . In fact, the occurrence 
of conflicting decisions is related to the occurrence of a certain case involving ambiguous 
sections of the Code of Civil Procedure21. This variable is therefore less related to 
political, economic, judicial conditions of the time.
Having found the sources of variation in judicial speed, I am now able to relate it 
to economic performance, particularly to the functioning of credit markets, registered 
manufacturing and trade sector performance.
3.5 The impact of the judiciary on economic out­
comes
This section relates the expected duration of High Court trials to economic activity. I 
use the following regressions:
e%t =  £* +  % + A durationu +  pxit +  fiit (3.2)
21 In the earlier example, the ‘violation of a precedent established by the same High Court’ variable 
takes the value 1 in 1984 in West Bengal because of a death of one party in a case in 1984, which is
independent from the judicial conditions at the time and the subsequent necessity to use Orders 22 and
23 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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where i corresponds to a State and t to time, eu is an economic outcome of in­
terest. I will first test Proposition 1, applied to the agricultural sector where issues of 
credit availability are more stringent, by using measures of agricultural credit supply 
and development. I will then test Proposition 2 by using measures of the development 
of registered manufacturing, unregistered manufacturing, trade, hotel and restaurants, 
banking and insurance, real estate sectors development and ultimately, poverty, e* are 
State fixed effects and r)t are time fixed effects. Xu axe control variables. I use the exact 
same control variables used in Table 3.2. fiit is a disturbance term. Standard errors are 
clustered by State to take into account concerns over serial correlation (Bertrand et al, 
2002). State fixed effects capture State-specific factors such as culture and geography. 
Year effects capture common shocks such as central amendments to the Code of Civil 
Procedure as well as other centrally implemented policies. The coefficient of interest is 
A.
There can clearly be some endogeneity between the efficiency of a particular insti­
tution and the economic performance of a particular State. The first issue is one of 
reverse causality: States with higher per capita incomes are able to devote more funds to 
improving institutions and thus have better institutions. The second issue is one of unob­
servable omitted variables, which are behind both judicial and economic outcomes, such 
as pessimism regarding a particular State’s prospects or the “backwardness” of another. 
This is why two instrumental variables are employed for the expected duration of High 
Court trials: “Court red tape” amendments and “violation of a precedent established 
by the same High Court”. A good instrumental variable is a variable correlated with 
the expected duration of a trial in High Court, exogenous (that is, not correlated with 
(iit) and not an explanatory variable in itself. The previous section demonstrated that 
“Court red tape” amendments and “violation of a precedent established by the same 
High Court” were significantly related to the expected duration of High Court trials. 
In Table 3.2, Column (4), the F-test of the joint significance of the two instruments is
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8.06. I make no claim that these two instruments are exogenous. I consider only those 
“less” endogenous amendments such as “Court red tape” amendments in lieu of “explicit 
speed” amendments. I also consider “violation of a precedent established by the same 
High Court” with some arbitrary temporal variation as emphasized earlier. This variable 
is one which lists all precedent violations established by the same High Court. In the par­
ticular example given above, this variable takes value 1 in 1984 in West Bengal because 
of the death of one party in a case, which is largely random, and the subsequent necessity 
to use Orders 22 and 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The temporal variation in the 
“conflicting” variable is not endogenous to economic, political or judicial conditions; it 
arises from the occurrence of cases pertaining to ambiguous sections of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Following Besley and Case (2000), I also account for forces that may lead to 
the enactment of these amendments. Additionally, I present Hausman’s results as well 
as over identification tests.
Table 3.3 examines the relationship between High Court trial duration and credit 
supply to agricultural sectors. For reasons highlighted in the theoretical section, I expect 
credit availability to be reduced in regions with slower judiciaries. I expect this problem 
to be more stringent for borrowers with less collateral, typically farmers. Column (1) 
shows an OLS regression of real per capita agricultural bank finance on the expected 
duration of a High Court trial. The result is insignificant. Column (2) presents a re­
duced form version of the impact of “Court red tape” amendments and “violation of 
a precedent established by the same High Court” on real per capita agricultural bank 
finance. This confirms the fact that these two variables have an impact on real per capita 
agricultural bank finance. One extra “violation of a precedent established by the same 
High Court” decreases real per capita agricultural bank finance by 6 percent, while one 
extra “Court red tape” amendment decreases it by 0.6 percent. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that “violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” and 
“Court red tape” amendments increase the expected duration of High Court trials, which,
85
in turn, discourages creditors from offering credit, since they know it will be harder to 
recover defaulted loans. It is possible to present some instrumental variable evidence. 
Column (3) instruments the expected duration of a trial in High Court with “violation 
of a precedent established by the same High Court” and “Court red tape” amendments. 
The coefficient of duration is now negative and significantly different from 0. For exam­
ple, an extra 18.8 days in the expected duration of a trial in High Court22 decreases real 
per capita agricultural bank finance by 6 percent. The fact that the instrumented coeffi­
cient is now statistically different from 0 as opposed to the OLS case may arise because 
of two reasons: simultaneity or unobserved State heterogeneity. Expected duration of a 
trial could affect negatively economic performance. In turn, economic performance can 
affect negatively the speed of the judiciary as contract intensive activities requiring third 
party adjudication develop (if funds devoted to its improvement are constant in absolute 
terms). As far as unobserved State heterogeneity is concerned, suppose that in a par­
ticular State citizens are especially fastidious, displaying meticulous attention to detail. 
They will thus be more litigious and file more cases since they are excessively sensitive 
to even the slightest deviation in the terms of a contract. This will increase the expected 
duration of a trial in High Court. On the other hand, economic performance will increase 
thanks to the citizenry’s careful attention to detail. This unobserved variable, if omit­
ted, will bias upward the coefficient between duration and economic performance. If the 
instrumental variables are appropriate, then this bias should be removed. This may be 
why I find a significantly negative coefficient in Column (3) as opposed to Column (1). 
The over-identification test in Column (3) is a test of joint significance of both instru­
ments in a regression of the fitted residuals from the second-stage on these instruments 
(and all exogenous variables). The instruments are not significantly different from 0 and 
pass the over-identification test. This confirms the fact that these two instruments are 
appropriate in this analysis. The over identification is often criticized because of its low
2 2 This was the increase implied by an extra “violation of a precedent established by the same High 
Court”
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power. I repeat the analysis using “violation of a precedent established by the same High 
Court” , “Court red tape” amendments, as well as “explicit speed” amendments, which 
are clearly endogenous. The over identification test is now negative, in the sense that 
these instruments are detected to be endogenous. This reinforces the statement that 
the two instrumental variables used are appropriate. The Hausman [1978] test tests the 
equality of the coefficients between OLS (efficient and consistent under HO only) and IV 
(always consistent). The x2 is significantly different from 0. This means that there is a 
systematic difference between OLS and IV. It is appropriate to instrument duration with 
“violation of a precedent established by the same High Court” and “Court red tape” 
amendments. This first result is confirmed in Columns (5) and (7). An increase of 18.8 
days in the expected duration of a High Court trial decreases the account number of 
commercial bank advances to agriculture per capita by 3.3 percent and real per capita 
regional rural bank credit by 6.4 percent.
It is especially interesting to look at the difference between the OLS and IV coef­
ficients. In Columns (3), (5) and (7), the IV coefficient seems seven times bigger in 
absolute terms than the OLS coefficients in corresponding columns (1), (4) and (6). This 
is consistent with a simultaneity bias more than with an unobserved State heterogeneity 
bias. Indeed, the unobserved State heterogeneity bias does not depend on the dependent 
variable used, as opposed to the simultaneity bias.
This reduced credit availability impedes agricultural development. Table 3.4 examines 
the relationship between the expected duration of a trial in High Court and agricultural 
development. Column (2) shows that an increase of 18.8 days in the expected duration of 
a trial in High Court decreases by 1.7 percentage points the ratio of irrigated agricultural 
land. As a result, agricultural performance is impeded by a weak judiciary. An increase 
of 18.8 days in the expected duration of a trial in High Court decreases per capita State 
agricultural domestic product by 0.6 percent in column (4). I use the rural head count 
index (in percentage) as the dependent variable in Column (6) to measure the impact of
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the judiciary on poverty. The latter shows that an increase of 18.8 days in the expected 
duration of a trial in High Court increases the rural head count index by 1.9 percentage 
points. The over identification tests using “violation of a precedent established by the 
same High Court” and “Court red tape” amendments are always conclusive. Adding 
“explicit speed” amendments, which are clearly endogenous, leads to rejection by the 
overid tests. The bias between columns (1), (3), (5) and (2), (4), (6) indicate that 
simultaneity bias is more important than the unobserved state heterogeneity bias.
These results seem to indicate that the judiciary plays a considerable role in the 
economic outcomes of India’s States. I found that farmers have less access to credit 
markets. As a result, agricultural development is impeded. The judiciary impacts the 
weaker sections of the country, such as the poor and farmers.
3.6 Conclusion
Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure that add or complicate procedures to be 
followed by the Court affect expected durations of High Court trials. I have addressed 
the issue of the endogeneity of temporal and spatial variation in the enactment of these 
amendments in three ways. First, I showed that these amendments are not purpose­
fully designed to reduce Court delays, in contrast to “explicit speed” amendments, which 
explicitly favour expeditious justice and are thus clearly responsive to the judicial condi­
tions of the time. Second, I used a panel data analysis and included State fixed effects 
that capture time invariant differences across States in policies and outcomes. Third, 
I accounted for factors that may have influenced the enactment of these amendments 
by Courts: the political environment during periods of Executive interference in judicial 
affairs as well as representation of Scheduled Castes/Tribes in Legislative Assemblies.
Similarly, the ambiguity of the Code of Civil Procedure, measured by the violation of 
precedents established by the same High Court, affects expected durations of High Court 
trials. This is because judges must spend time choosing between conflicting views after
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such events. The interesting feature of this variable is the temporal arbitrary occurrence 
of cases referring to ambiguous sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. In contrast 
to the amendments strategy followed earlier, the temporal variation in this variable is 
not endogenous to economic, political or judicial conditions. It arises only from the 
occurrence of cases pertaining to ambiguous sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 
the other hand, the spatial variation of this variable may be correlated with the quality 
of courts. I have sought to account for the quality of Courts in order to disentangle these 
two effects.
Finally, I related expected durations of High Court trials to economic outcomes. I 
used these “Court red tape” amendments and “violation of a precedent established by 
the same High Court” as instruments for the expected duration of a case in trial. I 
showed that these two instruments are significantly related to duration. They represent 
a spatial and temporal source of variation in trial duration. As such, they may be used as 
instruments. I found that the judiciary heavily shapes the economic outcomes of India’s 
States and that farmers have less access to credit markets. As a result, agricultural 
development is impeded. Judiciaries impact weaker sections of the country, such as the 
poor and farmers.
This paper has shown that the expected duration of High Court trials is a significant 
determinant of credit markets and agricultural performance. The policy implications are 
clear. To reduce expected durations of High Court trials, the number and complexity 
of procedures to be followed by the Courts must be reduced. Alternatively, the Code of 
Civil Procedure’s ambiguity must be reduced by simplifying and clarifying confusing and 
redundant rules. The recommendations of India’s Ex-Chief Justice K.N. Singh in the 
144th Law Commission Report entitled “Conflicting Judicial Decisions Pertaining to the 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908” should be followed. They have yet to be incorporated 
into the Civil Procedure Code. Clarifying each ambiguous rule will allow judges to save 
time by liberating them from having to deliberate over so many conflicting views.
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Figure 3-1: Cumulative index of the "Court red tape" amendments per state between 
1968 and 1996
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Figure 3-2: Cumulative index of the "implicit speed" amendments per state between 
1968 and 1996
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Figure 3-3: Cumulative index of the "Violation of a precedent established by another 
High Court" per state between 1968 and 1996
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Figure 3-6: Expected duration of a trial in High Court
Table 3.1: descriptive statistics of the amendments
_________________________________________ (1)_________________(?)_________________(3)
Type of amendment Definition No. of amendments overall
weighted by 
direction of 
amendment
sum
the
the
ratio weighted 
sum/number of 
amendments
“explicit speed” is it explicitely written that the amend­
ment is made for expeditious justice?
50 +24 0.48
mention of court power to extend limits does that leave the possibility to the 
court to set the time limits?=reforms 
defeated by courts
42 +34 0.81
“court red tape” more red tape for the court? 94 +36 0.383
“speed” does this amendments increase speed in 
any way?
288 +4 0.014
“defendant red tape” more red tape for the defendant? 34 +24 0.71
“poor” explicitely pro-poor? 50 +17 0.3
“agricultural” explicitely pro-agricultural? 22 +18 0.8
“business” explicitely mentioned pro-business? 33 -1 -0.03
“government” explicitely pro-government? 34 +26 0.8
“judgement-debtor” explicitely pro-judgement debtor? 149 +31 0.208
“demand-side solution” will that decrease demand for jus- 
tice?=less incentive to file a complaint?
47 +19 0.404
“plaintiff red tape” does that constitute more red tape for 
the plaintiff?
35 +2 0.714
“certainty” does that increase certainty of the out- 32 +10 0.313
come
Table 3.2: Im pact o f conflicting judicial decisions and court red tape am endm ents
o n  t h e  e x p e c t e d  d u r a t i o n  o f  a  t r i a l  i n  H i g h  C o u r t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) . (6)
expected duration of a trial in High Court
violation of a precedent established 0.051489 0.049651 0.052168 0.019746 0.020617 0.020084
by the same High Court (3.09)*** (2.68)** (1.98)* (2.12)* (2.13)* (2.14)*
Court red tape amendments 0.009263 0.010129 0.012678 0.008851 0.006098 0.009820
(2.04)* (2.03)* (2.41)** (3.09)*** (1.98)* (2.13)*
Ratio of dismissed appeals 0.001056 -0.001171 -0.001830 -0.001520 -0.001785
(0.44) (1.03) (1.88)* (1.90)* (1.87)*
Political controls (interacted) no yes yes yes yes yes
Sc/st seats (interacted) no no yes yes yes yes
Panchayats -0.000758 -0.000740 -0.000753
(1.73) (1.84)* (1.73)
Exp. Org. Of state (-2) 0.004945 0.004693 0.004938
(0.70) (0.70) (0.70)
Speed amendments 0.016366
(1.74)
Implicit speed amendments 0.003631
(0.37)
State fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
F-test of the joint significance of 9.03 7.19 3.47 8.06 4.76 4.53
violation and court red tape (p-value) (0.001) (0.003) (0.059) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 624 489 330 279 279 279
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Robust t statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. •
The dependent variable is the expected duration of a case in High Court, measured in number of pending cases plus number of filed cases
within the year divided by the number of cases disposed of within the year (unit=years) • violation of a precedent established by the same 
High Court is a cumulative variable increased by 1 forever after a High Court violated its own precedent. • Court red tape amendments 
is a cumulative variable increased by 1 forever after an amendments that add procedures to the court is enacted. • Ratio of dismissed 
appeals is the ratio of dismissed appeals to total appeals from the respective high court (percentage). Political controls (interacted) means 
the proportion of seats won by Congress parties, hard left parties, soft left parties and Bharatiya Janta parties interacted with a dummy 
indicating when the legislative assemblies are likely to influence the judicial process. Sc/St seats (interacted) includes the proportion of 
seats reserved to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in state legislative assemblies interacted with a dummy indicating when the legislative 
assemblies are likely to influence the judicial process and the proportion of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in the population according 
to censuses. Panchayats means the number of Panchayats per million capita in the state. Exp Org. of State (-2) means the proportion 
of total revenue expenditure spent on the Organs of State lagged two years. Speed amendments is a cumulative variable increased by 1 
after any amendment likely to have an impact on the speed of the courts is passed (includes explicit speed, court red tape, defendant red 
tape, judgement-debtor, demand-side solution, plaintiff red tape, certainty amendments). Implicit speed amendments is the difference 
between speed amendments and explicit speed amendments. • the F-test is a test of joint significance of the two instruments: violation 
of the precedents established by the same High Court and court red tape amendments, the p-value is presented in parentheses.
Table 3.3: Impact of the expected duration of a trial in High Court 
on agricultural credit availability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
real per capita agricultural bank finance number of account of 
commercial bank advances 
to agriculture per capita
real per capita regional 
rural bank credit
Model OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
duration -32.734788 -216.993629 -7.083866 -47.512413 -8.313900 -43.649922
(1.49) (2.98)*** (0.98) (3.61)*** (1.29) (2.69)**
violation of a precedent established -10.999666
by the same High Court (3.29)***
Court red tape amendments -1.143195
(4.26)***
Ratio of dismissed appeals -0.041734 0.056338 -0.335468 0.032787 -0.031661 -0.061114 -0.110393
(0.50) (0.68) (1.22) (1.09) (0.47) (2.44)** (2.80)**
Panchayats 0.005252 0.006108 -0.139389 0.003744 -0.027992 0.001121 -0.024664
(0.16) (0.30) (1.25) (0.34) (1.10) (0.16) (1.12)
Exp. Org. Of state (-2) -0.478392 -0.185783 0.715022 -0.083877 0.177972 0.031209 0.285049
(1.21) (0.82) (0.43) (0.61) (0.44) (0.31) (0.85)
Political controls (interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sc/st seats (interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Overid test (p-value of F-test)
Overid test (with explicit speed amendments) 
Hausman test (p-value of chi2)
0.13
0.06
132.5(0.00)
0.24
0.08
23.07(0.68)
0.41
0.04
61.77(0.00)
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 248 248
R-squared 0.90 0.92 0.77 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.77
Robust t statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. • In 
columns 1, 2, 3, the dependent variable is the real per capita agricultural bank finance (total). In column 2, a reduced form specification is presented, 
including the two variables (conflicting judicial decisions and court red tape amendments) found to have an influence on the duration of a case in 
Table 2. • Ratio of dismissed appeals is the ratio of dismissed appeals to total appeals from the respective high court (percentage). Panchayats 
means the number of Panchayats per million capita in the state. Exp Org. of State (-2) means the proportion of total revenue expenditure spent on 
the Organs of State lagged two years. Political controls (interacted) means the proportion of seats won by Congress parties, hard left parties, soft 
left parties and BJP parties interacted with a dummy indicating when the legislative assemblies are likely to influence the judicial process. Sc/St 
seats (interacted) includes the proportion of seats reserved to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in state legislative assemblies interacted with a 
dummy indicating when the legislative assemblies are likely to influence the judicial process and the proportion of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled 
Tribes in the population according to censuses. In columns 3, 5, 7, duration is instrumented with violation of a precedent established by the same 
high court and court red tape amendments.* The overid test in columns 3, 5, 7 is a test of joint significance of both instruments in a regression 
of the fitted residuals from the second-stage on these instruments.* The second overid test in columns 3, 5, 7 is a test of joint significance of both 
instruments and "explicit speed" amendments in a regression of the fitted residuals from the second-stage on these instruments. This flasification 
exercise, using purposefully wrong (endogenous) instruments, demonstrates the power of the overid test.* The Hausman test is a test of the equality 
of coefficients between OLS and IV. Under HO, OLS and IV are consistent and the coefficients should be equal. The chi2 value and the p-value of
Table 3.4: Impact of the expected duration of a trial in High Court 
on agricultural development and poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percentage of Irrigated 
Agricultural Land
per capita state agric dom 
prod, all sector ’OOOOORs
rural head count 
index (percentage)
Model OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
duration -7.459192 -32.944503 0.028560 -0.494391 -4.819344 36.635377
(1.23) (3.11)*** (0.40) (2.42)** (1.18) (3.43)***
Ratio of dismissed appeals -0.061733 -0.101188 0.000456 -0.000354 0.037128 0.101307
(2.48)** (2.60)** (0.49) (0.30) (1.51) (2.21)**
Panchayats -0.014478 -0.034870 0.000133 -0.000286 -0.016135 0.017035
(1.31) (1.80)* (0.77) (0.73) (1.80)* (1)
Exp. Org. Of state (-2) 0.041948 0.214765 0.000447 0.003993 0.124593 -0.156514
(0.38) (0.81) (0.26) (0.78) (1.45) (0.56)
Political controls (interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sc/st seats (interacted) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Overid test (p-value of F-test) 0.16 0.99 0.99
Overid test (with explicit speed amendments) 0.28 0.04 0.001
Hausman test (p-value of chi2) 1.06(1.00) 191.77(0.00) 788.90(0.00)
Observations 279 279 279 279 279 279
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.87
Robust t statistics in parentheses, clustered at the level of the state. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. • Ratio of dismissed appeals is the ratio of dismissed appeals to total appeals from the respective high court (percentage). 
Panchayats means the number of Panchayats per million capita in the state. Exp Org. of State (-2) means the proportion of total 
revenue expenditure spent on the Organs of State lagged two years. Political controls (interacted) means the proportion of seats 
won by Congress parties, hard left parties, soft left parties and BJP parties interacted with a dummy indicating when the legislative 
assemblies are likely to influence the judicial process. Sc/St seats (interacted) includes the proportion of seats reserved to Scheduled 
Castes/Scheduled Tribes in state legislative assemblies interacted with a dummy indicating when the legislative assemblies are likely 
to influence the judicial process and the proportion of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in the population according to censuses. 
In columns 2, 4, 6, duration is instrumented with violation of a precedent established by the same high court and court red tape 
amendments.* The overid test in columns 2, 4, 6 is a test of joint significance of both instruments in a regression of the fitted 
residuals from the second-stage on these instruments.* The second overid test in columns 2, 4, 6 is a test of joint significance of both 
instruments and "explicit speed" amendments in a regression of the fitted residuals from the second-stage on these instruments. 
This flasification exercise, using purposefully wrong (endogenous) instruments, demonstrates the power of the overid test.* The 
Hausman test is a test of the equality of coefficients between OLS and IV. Under HO, OLS and IV are consistent and the coefficients 
should be equal. The chi2 value and the p-value of the chi2 is presented.
Data Appendix 1: examples of other amendments
original rule amendment codification
"poor" Order 33-Suits by Indigent Persons, Rule 2 specifies that the 
High Court may make rules providing for the mode of selecting 
pleaders to be assigned and the facilities to be provided to such 
pleaders by the Court.
The Haryana High Court rules enacted in 1981 are the follow­
ing: the pleader has to have at least 5 years of experience; the 
system is based on willingness by the pleader; if pleader does 
not accept to plead free of charge, he will be paid on the state 
budget for a maximum of 300Rs; the legal aid has 7 days to 
prepare; additional bonuses of up to 150 Rs are available; the 
judge has a duty to convince competent senior lawyers to enlist 
themselves.
1 after 1981 
for Haryana
"agricultural" Order 21-Execution of Decrees and Orders, Rule 75(2): Special 
Provision relating to growing crops.- Where the crop from its 
nature does not admit of being stored, it may be sold before 
it is cut and gathered, and the purchaser shall be entitled to 
enter on the land, and to do all the necessary for the purpose 
of tending and cutting or gathering it.
Special Provision relating to growing crops.- Where the crop 
from its nature does not admit of being stored, or where it 
appears to the Court that the crop shall be sold to greater 
advantage in an unripe state, it may be sold before it is cut 
and gathered, and the purchaser shall be entitled to enter on 
the land, and to do all the necessary for the purpose of tending 
and cutting or gathering it.
1 after 1987 
for Goa, 
Dadra and 
Nagar Haveli
"business" additional Rule 5 of Order 15-Disposal of Suit at the First 
Hearing inserted in Uttar Pradesh in 1972: "Striking of defence 
on non-deposit of admitted rent.- In any suit by a lessor for 
the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the 
determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of 
rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the 
continuance of the lease, [...], the defendant shall, at or before 
the first hearing of the suit, [...], deposit the entire amount 
of rent, or compensation for use and occupation, admitted by 
him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of 
the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent,[...], and 
in the event of any default in this regard, the court may,[...], 
strike-off his defence."
"Striking of defence on non-deposit of admitted rent.- In any 
suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable 
property after the determination of his lease, and for the re­
covery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation 
thereof during the continuance of the lease, [...], the defendant 
shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, [...], deposit 
the entire amount of rent together with interest thereon at the 
rate of 9% per annum, or compensation for use and occupation, 
admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the con­
tinuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly 
rent within a week,[...], and in the event of any default in this 
regard, the court may,[...], strike-off his defence."
1 after 1972, 
and another 
1 after 1977 
for Uttar 
Pradesh
Data Appendix 1 continued
"government" Order 45-Appeals to the Supreme Court, Rule 7 specifies the 
security an appellant has to provide for the costs of the respon­
dent and to defray the expenses of translating, transcribing, 
transmitting a copy of the whole suit to the Court.
Rule 7-A is added in the Gujarat High Court in 1983: "Secu­
rity not to be demanded from Union or State Government or 
Government servant defended by Government. [...]"
1 after 1983 
for Gujarat
"judgement-
debtor"
Order 21-Execution of Decrees and Orders, Rule 40: "Proceed­
ings on appearance of judgement-debtor in obedience to notice 
or after arrest.- (2) Pending the conclusion of the inquiry [...] 
the Court may, in its discretion, order the judgement-debtor to 
be detained in the custody of an officer of the Court or release 
him on his furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court 
for his appearance when required."
"Proceedings on appearance of judgement-debtor in obedi­
ence to notice or after arrest.- (2) Pending the conclusion of 
the inquiry [...] the Court may, in its discretion, order the 
judgement-debtor to be detained in the custody of an officer of 
the Court on the decree-holder depositing in Court the neces­
sary amounts payable to the judgement-debtor and the Officer 
of the Court in connection with such detention, or release him 
on his furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court for 
his appearance when required."
1 after 1990 
for Kerala
"demand- 
side solu­
tion"
Order 1-Parties to Suits, the new rule 3-B added in Madhya 
Pradesh in 1984: "Conditions for entertainment of suits.- No 
suit or proceeding for declaration of title or any right over 
any agricultural land, with or without any other relief or for 
specific performance of any contract for transfer of any agricul­
tural land with or without any other relief shall be entertained 
by any Court, unless the plaintiff, knowing that a return un­
der section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural 
Holdings Act, 1960, [...] is required to be filed by him, has im­
pleaded the State of Madhya Pradesh as on of the defendants 
[...]."
1 after 1984 
for Madhya 
Pradesh
"plaintiff red 
tape"
Order 7-Plaint, Rule 9: "Procedure on admitting a plaint.- 
(lA)The plaintiff shall, within the time fixed by the Court 
[...], pay the requisite fee for the service of summons on the 
defendants."
"Procedure on admitting a plaint.- (lA)The plaintiff shall, 
within the time fixed by the Court [...], file summons in the 
prescribed form, in duplicate, after being dully filled in, for 
each of the defendants and pay the requisite fee for the service 
of summons on the defendants."
1 after 1982 
for Punjab 
and Haryana
"certainty" Order 21-Execution of Decrees and Orders, Rule 69: "Adjourn­
ment or stoppage of sale.- The Court may, in its discretion, ad­
journ any sale hereunder to a specified day and hour, and the 
officer conducting any such sale may in his discretion adjourn 
the sale, recording his reasons for such adjournment, [...]."
Adjournment or stoppage of sale.- The Court may, in its discre­
tion, adjourn any sale hereunder to a specified day and hour, 
and the officer conducting any such sale may in his discretion 
adjourn the sale to a specified day and hour, recording his 
reasons for such adjournment, [...].
1 after 1983 
for Maha­
rashtra
Data appendix 2: History of the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure in Allahabad (selected amendments)
page order rule year synopsis implicit
speed
explicit
speed
speed
court
court red defendant 
tape red tape
81 3-Recognised 
Agents and 
Pleaders
4-Appointment of a pleader 1994 appointment of a pleader in force until all proceedings 
ended (more proceedings added in this amendment, e.g. 
a proceeding for revision of an order in the suit, proceed­
ings for transfer) (=more quality)
81 3-Recognised 
Agents and 
Pleaders
4-Appointment of a pleader 1994 the pleader cannot plead if he doesn’t have a memoran­
dum signed by him that he has instructions from his 
client to appear, act or plead (=less speedy but better 
quality)
-1 1
86 4-Institution 
of Suits
1-Suits to be commenced by 
plaint
1926 the plaint has to be given with a copy of the service with 
the summons. The court can grant time for that.
-1
88 5-Issue and 
Service of 
Summons
2-Copy of plaint annexed to 
summons
1926 the defendant cannot be permitted to replace the plaint 
by a concise statement.
-1 1
89 5-Issue and 
Service of 
Summons
4-No party to be ordered to ap­
pear in person unless resident 
with certain limits
1926 the court can dispense with the service of any defendant 
who did not appear
1
92 5-Issue and 
Service of 
Summons
9A-Summons given to the plain­
tiff for service
1958 the court must send the summons to the defendant by 
post to his adress (as well as to him personnally) (=more 
red tape)
1
97 5-Issue and 
Service of 
Summons
21-Service of summons where 
defendant resides within juris­
diction of another court
1967 if defendant resides in jurisdiction of other court, can 
send the summon by post. If not returned, considered 
received. (=less red tape)
1 1
99 5-Issue and 
Service of 
Summons
21-Service where defendant re­
sides out of India and has no 
agent
1999 the only way to summon a defendant is by post as op­
posed to all the new ways of communication: fax, email 
accepted in 1999. (=therefore I put a -1 starting in 1999
-1
100 5-Issue and 
Service of 
Summons
25A1-Service where defendant 
resides out of India and has an 
agent empowered to accept ser­
vice of summons
1962 if the defendant has an agent, the summon can be sent 
to him
1
122 7-Plaint 19-25 1970 make sure it is the right jurisdiction, dismiss the case if 
bad adress, post summons if defendant not present, party 
must inform the court if change of adress
-1 1 1
131 8-Written 
statement, 
set-off and 
counter-claim
11-12 1971 every party shall give its adress to the court -1 1
Data Appendix 2 continued
page order rule year synopsis implicit
speed
explicit
speed
speed
court
court red defendant 
tape red tape
189 19-Affidavits 1-15 1981 if one party is absent, an affidavit can be given to proceed 
(more fair but less speedy than simple dismissal of the 
case if one party not present)
-1
194 20-Judgement 
and decree
7A-ormal order 1981 a party which wants to appeal can apply for a formal 
order (=memorandum of costs, adjudication...)
1
248 21-Execution 
of decrees and 
orders
54-Attachement of immovable 
property
1983 attachement of immovable property (im possibility to 
sell) is proclaimed at the date of the order (=can cancel 
a sell)
292 25-Security of 
costs
1-When security of costs may be 
required from plaintiff
1983 minor change
294 26-
Commissions
1-Cases in which Court may is­
sue commission to examine wit­
ness
1980 the court for speed reasons may issue a commission to in­
terrogate witnesses, (note: commission: send somebody 
to interrogate a witness if the witness is far, sick... =good 
for speedy justice)
1 1
294 26-
Commissions
1-Cases in which Court may is­
sue commission to examine wit­
ness
2002 cancelled by 1999 amendment (wef 2002) -1 -1
294 26-
Commissions
3-Where witness resides within 
Court’s jurisdiction
1980 a high court cannot issue commission, a court can say if 
it wants the commission to be returned to a subordinate 
court
1
295 26-
Commissions
4-Persons for whose examina­
tion commission may issue
1980 Omit Rule 4: a commision can be issued for somebody 
resident beyond the limits of the jurisdiction, or for a 
civil servant
-1 -1
295 26-
Commissions
4-Persons for whose examina­
tion commission may issue
1980 Omit Rule 4 (2): a court can say if it wants the commis­
sion to be returned to a subordinate court
-1
295 26-
Commissions
7-Return of commission with 
depositions of witnesses
1980 the evidence obtained in a commission is regarded as ev­
idence, with or without the consent of the party against 
whom testimony is made, (more speedy, no exceptions 
to the evidence in a commission, even for person in the 
service of Government)
1
357 37-Summary
procedure
1-Courts and classes of suits to 
which the order is to apply
1975 other courts means district judges, civil judges, munsifs
367 39-Temporary 
injunctions 
and interlocu­
tory orders
3A-Court to dispose of appli­
cation for injunction within 30 
days
1981 rule of 1976 amendment omitted: the application of in­
junction shall be dealt with in 30 days.
-1
Data Appendix 2 continued
page order rule year synopsis implicit explicit speed 
speed speed court
court red defendant 
tape red tape
374 41-Appeals 
from original 
decrees
1-Form of appeal. What to ac­
company memorandum
1994 that rule omitted: if appeal against a decree for money, 
such money must be deposited by the appelant (=less 
incentive to appeal)
378 41-Appeals 
from original 
decrees
5-Stay by appelate Court 1994 that 1976 rule: the appelant has to give security for the 
court to make an order to stay the execution of the de­
cree; is only for decree for payment of money. (+time 
limit fixed by court).
1
382 41-Appeals 
from original 
decrees
14-Publication and service of 
notice of day for hearing appeal
1981 the amendment makes sure that the pleader is compe­
tent to receive the notice on the behalf of the defendant 
(maybe more speedy)
1
387 41-Appeals 
from original 
decrees
22-Upon hearing respondent 
may object to decree as if he had 
preferred separate appeal
1994 adds ambiguity to the time allowed: is it hearing of the 
appeal or appearance in the appeal??
-1
404 45-Appeals to 
the Supreme 
Court
3-Inquiry as to whether appli­
cant is an indigent person
1987 exact same rule turned upside down
419 48-
Miscellaneous
10 1983 the adresses of the parties shall hold good during a review 
(=more certainty, more red tape court)
1
446 Appendix B- 
Process
Form N. 1-A 1987 possibility to summon/notice for service by advertise­
ment in a newspaper
1
Data Appendix 3
Variable Range Source Mean St. Dev.
Court data
Expected duration of a trial in High Court 1971-1996 Law commission reports, Annual Report, Ministry 
of Law, Justice and Company Affairs and archives 
of the Supreme Court of India
1.7 0.77
Control Variables
Proportion of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, 1971-1992 Election Commission document relating to elec­ 0.28502 0.14009
Tribes in the legislative assemblies* tion in a state
Proportion of Scheduled Castes, Tribes in the pop­ 1971-1992 Census. 0.22029 0.08153
ulation
Proportion of Congress seats (Indian National 1957-1990 “India decides: Elections 1952-1991” , by Butler, 0.46163 0.25201
Congress, Indian Congress Socialist, Indian Na­
tional Congress Urs
Proportion of hard left seats (Communist Party of 
India -I- Communist Party of India Marxist) 
Proportion of soft left seats (Socialist Party +  
Praja Socialist Party)
Proportion of Hindu parties (Bhartiya Janata 
Party +  Bhartiya Jana Sangh)
Lahiri and Roy (1991).
0.07952
0.02475
0.1571
0.14119
0.04278
0.21055
Number of Panchayats per million capita 
Share of the State Expenditure for the Organs of
1971-1996
1972-1992
Central Statistical Organisation
Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance,
325.47
10.2634
319.096
10.1331
State out of the total revenue expenditure Government of India
Ratio of dismissed appeals 1971-1996 Supreme Court Judgements, 2000 CDROM, ratio 
of dismissed appeals to toal appeals from the re­
spective High Court.
55.42 15.0107
Data Appendix 3 continued
Economic Outcomes
real per capita agricultural bank finance (total) 
number of account of commercial bank advances to agri­
culture per capita
real per capita regional rural bank credit
1971-1996
Statistical Tables relating to Banks 
in India, Reserve Bank of India
43.04
16.42
8.78
37.19
13.84
7.35
Percentage of Irrigated Agricultural Land 1971-1993 IFPRI 30.65 20.8
per capita state agricultural domestic product ’OOOOORs 
log state domestic product of manufacturing 
log state domestic product of registered manufacturing 
log state domestic product of unregistered manufactur­
1971-1996 Central Statistical Organisation 
and Indian Statistical Institute
1.864
0.69
0.12
-0.25
0.947
1.29
1.45
1.18
ing
log per capita state trade, hotel and restaurants domes­
tic product
log per capita state banking and insurance domestic 
product
log per capita state real estate domestic product
1.68
0.42
0.06
0.74
1.04
0.88
Urban Head Count Index (percentage) 1958-1992, 1994 “A database on Poverty and Growth in 
India” , prepared by Ozler, Datt, Raval- 
lion (1996)
41.2053 13.5433
Chapter 4 
The Benefits and Costs of 
Microfinance: Evidence from  
Bangladesh.
4.1 Introduction
Advocates of microfinance support the view that it could break the vicious cycle of 
poverty. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, one of the flagship programs, reports that:
“It is estimated that the average household income of Grameen Bank 
members is about 50 percent higher than the target group in the control 
village, and 25 percent higher than the target group non-members in Grameen 
Bank villages.”12
This statement is however subject to two important criticisms concerning program 
evaluation. First, the placement of the program is non-random. Comparing Grameen 
Bank members to the target group in control villages would isolate the impact of mi­
crofinance as well as systematic differences between villages3. Second, the attribution of 
loans is on a voluntary basis. People self-select in microfinance. It might be that people
1 http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/bcycle.html
2 The target group is the group of people with less than 0.5 acres of land, which is the eligibility 
condition for microfinance.
3For example, if the program was first placed in villages where people would benefit more from the 
program, such a comparison could yield a positively biased result.
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who try to obtain a loan differ in a systematic way from people who do not attempt to 
get a loan. Comparing Grameen Bank members to the target group in Grameen Bank 
villages would isolate the impact of microfinance as well as systematic differences between 
these two groups (such as entrepreneurial skills for example). In this paper, I use a large 
survey collected in Bangladesh in 1992/93, containing information on ineligible as well 
as eligible individuals, participants and non participants, treatment and control villages. 
I use the matching technique to adjust for differences in pre-treatment characteristics 
between treatment and non-treatment groups by pairing each treated individual to a 
non-treated unit with the “same” observable characteristics. Given the assumption that 
relevant differences between two groups are captured by their observable characteristics, 
the average outcome experienced by the matched pool of non-treated individuals identi­
fies the counterfactual outcome the treated units would have experienced had they not 
been treated. I use this technique to compare Grameen Bank members to the target 
group in the control village and to the target group non-members in Grameen Bank 
villages.
Microfinance has often been described as a win-win programme. Dr Muhammad 
Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, has recently received the Peace Nobel Prize 
“for their efforts to create economic and social development from below”. Evaluating the 
benefits of microfinance is therefore a topic of first-order importance. Theoretically, it is 
quite clear that access to credit for the poor is key to economic development. The reluc­
tance of banks to lend to people without collateral could cause poverty traps (Banerjee 
and Newman, 1993). Finding ways to give loans to poor people without collateral could 
lift a country out of poverty. Microfinance is based on the voluntary formation of small 
groups of five people to provide mutual, morally binding group guarantees in lieu of the 
collateral required by conventional banks. This mechanism has allowed the Grameen 
bank to experience repayment rates of up to 95%. Grameen has been replicated world­
wide and has inspired over 7,000 microfinance institutions in Latin America, Africa, and
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Asia serving 25 million poor clients. Access to credit could increase expenditure of partic­
ipants by encouraging projects start-up and raising labor supply. It could also increase 
child enrolment in school if the opportunity cost of school decreases due to increased 
parental wealth.
The empirical evidence is much less clear. Using the Bangladesh data set I refered to, 
P itt et al (1998) use an identification strategy based on a discontinuity contained in the 
Grameen Bank’s eligibility rules for programme participation (people with less than half 
an acre of land are eligible). The discontinuity rule evaluation compares individuals just 
above and below the eligibility rule. It concluded that programme participation raised 
household consumption by 18 Takas for every 100 Takas lent to an individual woman.
However, Morduch (1998) points out that the discontinuity rule is not respected in 
practice. Indeed, almost 25% of participants are mistargeted in the sense that they own 
more than 0.5 acres of land. Morduch points to one participant possessing 13.4 acres 
of land. This analysis casts doubt on Pitt and Khandker’s results. Morduch prefers a 
simple difference-in-difference approach comparing eligible to ineligible in treated villages 
to the same difference in control villages. He finds no significant effect resulting from 
microfinance exposure. In his response to Morduch, P itt (1999) noted however that this 
difference-in-differences approach fails to deal with the key issue of programme placement. 
If the Grameen Bank focuses on areas where inequality between rich and poor is greatest, 
Morduch’s estimate will be biased downwards.
In contrast to these two papers, I use the matching technique to compare outcomes 
of Grameen Bank members to the target group in control villages and to the target 
group non-members in Grameen Bank villages. This technique relies on two identifica­
tion assumptions. First, the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) states that 
non-treated outcomes are what treated outcomes would have been had they not been 
treated conditional on a set of observables. I am unable to test this hypothesis directly 
but I use different set of observables to provide a convincing set of observables. Sec­
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ond, the Common Support hypothesis states that there exists a set of individuals where 
all treated agents have a counterpart in the non-treated population and anyone consti­
tutes a possible participant. I am able to test this hypothesis. I find that microfinance 
increased expenditure of participants by 3% compared to expenditure of matched indi­
viduals in control villages. On the other hand, I did not find any significant differences 
between participants and non-participants in villages with microfinance. This indicates 
the presence of positive externalities of microfinance at the level of villages I also find 
that microfinance does not act as a consumption smoothing mechanism, that males and 
females increased their labor supply and that enrolment of boys and girls increased due 
to microfinance.
The paper’s structure is as follows, section 4.2 will describe the data used, section 
4.3 will describe matching technique, section 4.4 will present the preferred specification 
and results, section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 D ata
In this paper, I use a large survey collected in Bangladesh in 1992/93. Figure 4.1 de­
scribes the data set used. Group A corresponds to ineligible individuals in villages having 
access to microfinance whereas group B corresponds to ineligible individuals in villages 
without microfinance. Group C corresponds to eligible individuals who choose not to 
participate and group D to eligible individuals who choose to participate in villages 
where microfinance is available. Group E includes eligible individuals in villages without 
microfinance.
The question of whether microfinance is beneficial to customers is a typical evalu­
ation problem. The objective here is to identify the average effect of participation in 
microfinance on, for example, expenditure, in cases where people have access to the for­
mer. A participant’s expenditure should be compared to a counterfactual expenditure- 
i.e. that of the same individual in the same situation at the same time without access to
110
microfinance. Since the counterfactual is never observed, even with individual panel data 
observations, it must be estimated. Ideally, an experiment would randomly assign loans 
to people and compare average outcomes of groups with and without loans. Lacking 
a controlled randomised experiment, we must turn to non-experimental methods that 
mimic it under reasonable conditions.
One should not estimate microfinance’s impact by differentiating expenditure between 
group D participants and group C non-participants. Such a difference would be mislead­
ing due to problems of self-selection. People self-select in microfinance programmes. This 
difference would measure entrepreneurial skills as well as microfinance impact. Equipped 
with such skills, participants might have done better with or without microfinance.
P itt et al (1998) use a regression discontinuity design based on the eligibility rule. 
Arguing this rule is not respected, Morduch (1999) uses a simple difference-in-difference 
approach by comparing C+D to A, to E to B, and finds no significant effect resulting 
from microfinance exposure. P itt (1999) noted however that this difference-in-differences 
approach fails to deal with the key issue of programme placement. Other Evaluation 
Techniques cannot be used in this context. Zaman (2000) uses the number of eligible 
households in each village in 1992 as an instrumental variable. The rationale behind this 
is that while a larger number of potential members in a village will reduce the likelihood 
of eligible households from participating in microfinance, it is difficult to see why this 
variable should affect the poverty status of households. I have tested if the number of 
eligible households in each village in 1992 is correlated with participation in microfinance 
but not with the outcomes presently under consideration. It is not a significant variable in 
the participation equation. It is not correlated with the following outcomes: woman non­
land assets and woman labour. It is however correlated with logarithm of expenditure per 
capita, male labour and male and female school enrolment. This instrumental variable 
is therefore not appropriate in this context.
Another method often used in the evaluation literature is the difference-in-differences
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strategy: it compares participating and non-participating individuals, before and after 
treatment occurs. However, pre-programme observations are unavailable in the data set 
and the difference-in-differences technique cannot be applied.
Given the failure of traditional empirical strategies to appropriately measure micro­
finance’s impact in this context, I will now turn to the technique of matching. It is 
preferable in this context since no clear criteria are available to explain the participation 
of individuals in microfinance. Indeed, the 0.5 acre eligibility cut-off is not respected in 
practice and participation in microfinance is voluntary. Comparing individuals across vil­
lages is also erroneous given the existence of non-random programme placement. In light 
of these difficulties, matching is preferable since it ‘builds’ an appropriate counterfactual 
for each participant.
4.3 M ethodology
Statistical matching adjusts for differences in pre-treatment characteristics between treat­
ment and non-treatment groups by pairing each treated individual to a non-treated unit 
with the "same" observable characteristics. Given the assumption that relevant differ­
ences between two groups are captured by their observable characteristics, the average 
outcome experienced by the matched pool of non-treated units/individuals identifies the 
counterfactual outcome the treated units would have experienced had they not been 
treated.
Matching’s two assumptions are:
• the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA): it is a condition on the set of 
observables X . Non-treated outcomes are independent of the participation status:
y0 i d \x
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for X i E S, S  being defined in the next assumption. In other words, non-treated 
outcomes are what treated outcomes would have been had they not been treated.
• The Common Support (set S): all treated agents have a counterpart in the non- 
treated population and anyone constitutes a possible participant:
P{D  =  l|X) < 1
for X i E S.
Upon verification of these two assumptions, matching appears well-suited to deal with 
potential bias. This is made clear by decomposing the treatment effect in the following 
way:
E{Yl -  Y0\X ,D  = 1) = ]§(Y \X ,D  = \) -E {Y 0\X ,D  =  0)]- \E(Y0\X ,D  = 1 )-E (Y 0\X ,D  = 0)]
The first term is observed, while the second is called the bias conditional on X. 
Three causes of bias may occur when estimating the average treatment on the Treated. 
Following Heckman’s analysis (1997), there may, first, be a difference in the support of X 
in the two groups: individuals in both would be systematically different. Matching only 
on Common Support eliminates this bias. Second, there may be a difference between the 
two groups in the distribution of X over its Common Support. This bias is eliminated 
since matching reweighs D=0 data in order to equate the distribution of X in the D=1 
sample. Third, there may be a bias due to unobservables. The magnitude of that bias 
will depend on the adequacy of the CIA assumption in the specific problem.
The advantages of matching are that selection on observables is controlled for, it 
is a semi-parametric technique (functional form for the comparison of outcome is not 
specified), and that only individuals on the common support, in other words comparable, 
are compared. Its disadvantages are that selection on unobservables is not controlled
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for and that the hypothesis of Common Support can be restrictive. A critical step in 
matching technique is therefore the choice of the X ’s. Any variable that is thought to 
influence both participation and outcome is to be included4. In the results section I will 
present three different specifications in the choice of Xs and justify the choice of the 
preferred specification. Another disadvantage of matching is the curse of dimensionality. 
It can be very time and effort consuming to match on a number of X ’s. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (83) demonstrated that if (Yi, Y q _L D \ X )  for X  in S  (the Common Support), and 
0 < P ( X )  < 1 for X  in S  then ( Y i , Y q _L D \ P ( X ) )  for X  in S .  This solves the curse 
of dimensionality: individuals can be matched on P { X )  instead of X .  This is called 
propensity-score matching.
Each treated individual must be then paired with a group of comparable non-treated 
individuals (depending on the matching technique). The outcome Y* of individual i is 
associated with a matched outcome Yi equal to a weighted outcome of each component 
of a comparison group:
Y* =  Y I  w ijY j  
jec°(pi)
Where C°(pi) is the set of neighbours of treated individual i in the D=0 group and 
Wij is a particular weight associated with outcome Y j .
I use four matching techniques:
• Nearest Neighbour: treated unit i is matched to non-treated unit j  such that:
p-p \=3$fp-p&
4 It is interesting to note that we need variables good enough to provide a reasonable explanation of 
participation but not too good, since in cases where a certain X allowed us to discriminate perfectly 
between participant and non-participant, then a regression discontinuity design with such a variable 
would be more appropriate than matching technique.
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The drawback of this technique is that the assumption of Common Support is not 
imposed: two observations with a very big difference in their propensity scores 
could be matched if this difference is the lowest among the comparison group.
Caliper Matching: for <5>0, i is matched to j  such that:
s>\p-Pj\=$$fp-p$
This technique imposes the Common Support hypothesis as opposed to Nearest Neigh­
bour.
• Stratification: for a prespecified length of a stratum, the matched outcome is the 
arithmetic average of the outcome of the individuals in the stratum.
• Kernel Matching: here we consider all observations with a decreasing weight with 
the distance between two observations:
T,- =
I have chosen here a gaussian K : K (u) oc exp(—u2/2) which takes into consideration 
all non-treated units.
The average treatment of the treated (ATT) is then:
ATT=  X f o - A t o
fe{D=lnCS}
Where U i= l/  (number treated within the common support)
i K-0}
’ P i - P j
y yj
X *
{d=o}
( P ' - p A
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These four techniques should be compared. The Nearest Neighbour technique must 
be considered very carefully since it violates the Common Support hypothesis. Even 
if there is no comparable “enough” unit, this technique will provide an estimate. We 
should not be overly attentive to the results of this estimate. Imposing a caliper is more 
appropriate but remains imprecise compared to stratification and kernel techniques since 
only one individual is matched with each participant. Stratification technique uses an 
average of several individuals as a matched individual. However, equal weight is given 
to an individual at the limit of the stratum and to an individual close to the observed 
unit, since the average is only arithmetic. The kernel estimation gives each individual a 
weight decreasing in distance compared to the unit being studied. The kernel estimation 
does not impose per se the Common Support hypothesis, since all individuals in the 
comparison group are used, though it is very precise, since several individuals with the 
proper weights are used in the matched outcome. The stratification and kernel techniques 
should therefore be preferred for these reasons. I will present only those results obtaining 
from these two estimation techniques.
Additional sources of variability are introduced by estimating the propensity score 
and by the matching process. We need therefore to obtain bootstrapped confidence 
intervals for the matching estimates, as there is no asymptotic distribution theory for 
these estimates.
What follows summarises my chosen methodology. The average outcome experienced 
by the matched pool of non-treated units identifies the counterfactual outcome the treated 
units would have experienced had they not been treated under the following assumptions:
(1) relevant differences between the two groups are captured by their observable charac­
teristics (in other words, the right set of Xs described in the next section and included in 
the propensity score), and (2 ) treated individuals are matched with non-treated individ­
uals on a Common Support (which is why we will only consider stratification and kernel 
techniques).
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4.4 Results
The first practical step of a matching analysis is the computation of its propensity score 
using the right set of Xs. Once the preferred specification has been chosen, I will then 
be able to obtain matching results of the benefits of microfinance.
4.4.1 Propensity score
The left hand side variable is a variable that takes value 1 when individuals participate in 
microfinance, 0 otherwise. I will use a logit specification as the outcome is a binary vari­
able. The predicted probability of each individual will then be its propensity score. The 
intuition for this technique is that two individuals with the same propensity scores, one 
participating in microfinance, the other not, will have no systematic differences beyond 
participation in microfinance. The difference in outcomes is due to microfinance and 
nothing else. The propensity score is crucial in this analysis since the key drawback of 
matching is that only selection on the observables X  may be controlled for. Any variable 
influencing both participation and outcomes should be included. To deal with this prob­
lem, I will use three different specifications. First, I will consider the specification used in 
P itt (1998). I will then include variables that could be relevant to the participation deci­
sion in specification 2 in order to maximise the R 2. Finally, I will keep the most relevant 
variables in specification 3 in order to maximise the number of kept observations. The 
difference between specifications 2 and 3 illustrates the trade-off between explanatory 
power and multicollinearity. Village dummies are included in the three specifications.
Table 4.1 presents the results of this propensity score estimation. Column 1 presents 
descriptive statistics of each variable. Column 2 of Table 4.1 presents results from the 
first specification. The explanatory power of the specification used by Pitt and Khandker 
is limited. The Pseudo-i?2 of the participation regression is only 0.1502. The propensity 
score coming from this specification will lack accuracy. Column 3 presents the results 
from Specification 2. I include in this specification every variable that could be thought of
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as having an impact on either participation or an outcome of interest. The R2 is 0.3561. 
A surprising result in this specification is that the Highest Grade Completed is not corre­
lated to participation. However, this variable was very seldom measured in the data set 
and varies from one round to another for the same individual. I replace it with a dummy 
variable indicating whether the individual went to school or not, less precise but also less 
prone to measurement error in Specification 3. The coefficient preceding this variable 
is now positively significant in Specification 3, as shown in Column 4. The coefficient 
preceding gender is significantly negative since women are given preferential treatment 
in regards to loans by microfinance institutions. Individual age is positively correlated 
with participation. This surprising result can be refined by introducing non-linear age 
variables. Individual age to the square and to the fourth is significantly negative in spec­
ifications 2 and 3. This indicates that older individuals are more likely to participate 
but with diminishing career concerns. In Specifications 2 and 3, I include variables that 
might influence both participation and outcomes. Individuals with savings, livestock or 
non-farming enterprises are more likely to participate in microfinance. This suggests that 
even though the Grameen Bank targets the poor, it is not the poorest who participate. 
It also highlights the fact that it is important to control such variables when evaluating 
propensity scores in order to match comparable individuals. That the coefficient of agri­
cultural wages is positive and that of non-agricultural wages is negative may suggest that 
the Grameen Bank targets agricultural professions. To conclude, Specification 3 should 
be preferred since more observations are kept and the pseudo-R 2 is high.
The second step is to predict the propensity score of each individual. I graphed 
the distribution of participants’ propensity scores according to Specification 1 in Figure 
4.2. It is easy to compare it with Figure 4.3, which plots the distribution of propensity 
scores for non-participants in villages with microfinance. The distribution in Figure 4.3 is 
more tilted to the left than was expected: non-participating individuals have low scores. 
Figure 4.4 shows the same distribution for individuals in villages without microfinance.
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This group appears promising in regards to the breadth of Common Support: these 
villages contained people who would have chosen participation and are therefore much 
more comparable to participants. Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 plot the same distribution 
according to Specification 3. The fact that the latter possesses more explanatory power 
than Specification 1 can be seen in the first two graphs: the distribution of the propensity 
score for participants is more spread out than in Specification 1 . Specification 3 should 
be preferred. Common Support is greater with individuals in villages without microfi­
nance. However, two modifications should be added here. First, the propensity score 
must be corrected. Village dummies were included in the logit specification. I estimate a 
‘corrected’ propensity score by equating all village variables to zero for individuals with 
access to microfinance in order to make it comparable to individuals without such ac­
cess. Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 present the distribution of the corrected propensity score 
for participants, nonparticipants in villages with microfinance and people without such 
access. Second, I purge the logarithm of per capita expenditure from village effects. I 
regress this quantity on village dummies from both the programme and control villages 
only and estimate the residual arising from this regression. I call this quantity the "pure" 
logarithm of per capita expenditure since it is now freed from all village level effects.
To conclude, the preferred specification is Specification 3 because it includes more 
observations and maximises the pseudo-R 2. In order to match treated individuals with 
individuals in villages without microfinance, I predict the propensity score without con­
sidering village dummies. To account for non-random programme placement, I purge 
every outcome of village fixed effects. With this preferred specification, I will now present 
matching results.
4.4.2 M atching R esults
Matching results are presented in Table 4.2. Two observations can be made about choice 
of specification and choice of matching strategy. First, I have already stated that Speci­
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fication 3 should be preferred since more observations are kept and the model’s explana­
tory power is greater. P itt’s specification (1998) has limited explanatory power, having 
a pseudo-R 2 of 0.1502. Its propensity score thus lacks accuracy. The consequence of 
Specification l ’s inadequacy is visible in the insignificance of the results. I therefore 
prefer to exploit a more exhaustive specification called Specification 2. The pseudo-i?2 
is 0.3561. Although insufficient, this figure is quite high. An even better specification is 
Specification 3. The variables used were significant and as many observations as possible 
were conserved. With Specification 2 , only 425 participants are matched due to miss­
ing variables. In Specification 3, 703 out of 705 participants are included. We should 
therefore only consider the results of Specification 3. The second point pertains to choice 
of matching strategy. The Nearest Neighbour technique warrants careful consideration. 
This technique violates the Common Support hypothesis. Even if there is no comparable 
‘enough’ unit, the technique will provide an estimate. We should not linger over the 
results of this estimator. Imposing a caliper is more appropriate but remains imprecise 
compared to stratification and kernel techniques. Stratification technique gives equal 
weight to individuals at the limit of the stratum and to individuals close to the observed 
unit. A better technique is kernel estimation: an individual receives a weight decreasing 
in distance compared to the unit studied. I only present results arising from stratification 
and kernel techniques.
The first row contains results comparing expenditure of participants to expenditure of 
matched non-participants in treated villages. The difference in expenditure is negative, 
contrary to prior expectations but not very significant. This may indicate the presence 
of positive externalities resulting from microfinance. Non-participants in treated villages 
do not fare worse than participants. In the second row, I compare participants and 
non-participants in control villages. The propensity score is corrected and per capita ex­
penditure are purged from village level effects to take into account non-random program 
placement and according to the procedure described earlier. The results of the stratifi­
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cation technique are significantly positive. The kernel estimate results are significantly 
positive and very close to those of stratification. The former are very robust in regards to 
bandwidth changes. The kernel estimate is about 0.028 and significant at the 1% level. 
It is a matter of comparing the logarithm expression of the per capita expenditure. This 
means that a participant would be able to spend 3% more than a comparable individual 
in a control village. Individually, this means that on average people earn 250 Takas more 
than non-participants. The monetary value of such an improvement can be calculated for 
each individual as in the previous description. This benefit can be divided by the amount 
of each individual’s loan: the average of this variable is 0.028. This means that out of a 
100 Taka loan, people may spend 2.8 Takas more. This result is inferior to P itt’s (1998) 
in that the analysis was potentially biased positively. Indeed, as Morduch (1999) showed, 
the 0.5 acre eligibility rule was not enforced. Using a regression discontinuity design, one 
can then compare individuals with landholdings just below 0.5 acres to individuals whose 
landholdings are just above 0.5 acres. However, as Morduch (1999) also showed, a num­
ber of individuals with landholdings greater than 0.5 acres actually received microfinance 
loans. There is no participation discontinuity in the 0.5 acre programme. The two con­
ditions for a successful regression discontinuity design are that there be a discontinuity 
in participation in the 0.5 acre programme but no discontinuity in the disturbance term, 
or unobserved heterogeneity, at this point. One can show that if the first condition is 
violated (no discontinuity in participation of individuals possessing 0.5 acres), then the 
estimated coefficient from the regression discontinuity design may be biased upwards. 
My result is superior to that of Morduch (1999) since the latter found the impact of 
microfinance insignificant. Indeed, Morduch only estimates the effect of exposure to, and 
not participation in, microfinance. Moreover, as Pitt showed, Morduch did not take into 
account non-random programme placement. Villages without microfinance may be more 
equal, while the poor in microfinance villages may be systematically worse off than the 
poor in non-microfinance villages. This will underestimate the impact of the programme.
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Microfinance may impact the lives of the poor in many other ways. We can replicate 
our analysis with different outcomes. I will consider the six outcomes included in Pitt
(1998): variation in expenditure, women’s non-land assets, female and male labour sup­
ply and female and male school enrolment. I present in Table 4.3 the results comparing 
treated individuals with non-treated individuals in villages without microfinance, correct­
ing for non-random programme placement in the propensity score and in the outcome, 
using the kernel technique.
The first result regards variation in the log of per capita expenditure. As the previous 
literature has shown, we find microfinance having a negative impact on expenditure 
variation. Microfinance has an income smoothing effect. However, the results are not 
very significant. Women also appear to benefit from microfinance as far as their non­
land assets are concerned, which it significantly increases. Moreover, the aforementioned 
risk reduction would appear to result from income rather than consumption smoothing. 
People tend to work more when participating in microfinance. Women typically work 
around 80 hours more per month. This is a smaller estimate than for men, which suggests 
that the former’s access to microfinance increases household consumption, presumably by 
increasing the productivity of their market time rather than by increasing the supply of 
that time. One possible explanation for the fact that men increase their supply of labour 
more than women may be found in the average size of loans available both sexes. Men 
tend to borrow bigger amounts. The average Grameen Bank loan to male customers was 
13,642 Takas, whereas the average loan to female customers was 11,542 Takas. Men’s 
projects tend to be bigger although the difference in loan amounts granted to female 
and male customers is not quite large. The last point is associated with the impact of 
microfinance on education. Microfinance seems to increase both male and female school 
enrolment. Girl’s school enrolment in particular is positively affected by the participation 
in microfinance. Weaker results for boys may simply be a reflection of their greater initial 
enrolment. In fact, 60% of boys were enrolled, compared to only 56% of girls.
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By comparing treated individuals to comparable individuals lacking access to micro- 
finance, I found that certain people did indeed benefit from microfinance. However, I do 
not find significant differences with non participating individuals in treatement villages, 
pointing to the presence of externalities.
4.5 Conclusion
By comparing participants to matched individuals in non-treated villages, I found that 
microfinance has a positive impact on participants’ expenditure, supply of labour and 
male/female school enrolment. Participants spend on average 3% more than non-participants. 
This result is inferior to that of P itt (1998) as the latter’s analysis was potentially biased 
upward. Indeed, as Morduch (1999) showed, the 0.5 acre eligibility rule was not enforced. 
Using a regression discontinuity design, individuals with landholdings just below 0.5 acres 
are compared to individuals with landholdings just above 0.5 acres. However, as Morduch
(1999) showed, a number of individuals with landholdings greater than 0.5 acres actually 
received microfinance loans. There is no discontinuity in programme participation at 0.5 
acres. The two conditions for a successful regression discontinuity design are that there 
be discontinuity in programme participation at 0.5 acres but no discontinuity in the dis­
turbance term (unobserved heterogeneity) at this point. It can be shown that if the first 
condition is violated (no discontinuity in the participation of individuals at 0.5 acres), 
then the coefficient estimated by the regression discontinuity design is likely to be biased 
upwards. My result is superior to that of Morduch (1999), who found microfinance to 
be of insignificant impact. Morduch limited his estimation to the effect of exposure to, 
and not participation in, microfinance. Moreover, as P itt showed, Morduch did not ac­
count for non-random programme placement. While villages without microfinance may 
be more equal, the poor in microfinanced villages may be systematically worse off than 
the poor in non-microfinanced villages. This will tend to underestimate the impact of 
the programme.
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This paper finds significantly smaller estimates than previous studies or the Grameen 
Bank estimates. However, a word must be said regarding the limitations of this ap­
proach. Microfinance does have a number of other positive impacts not evaluated here. 
It empowers women who formerly restricted by social custom from working outside the 
home, promotes self-sufficiency and enhances education by providing training. Moreover, 
traditional evaluation literature focuses on the programme’s direct effect and is not a gen­
eral equilibrium analysis. There might be certain positive externalities to microfinance. 
There might also be numerous indirect effects, such as displacement effects (activities 
created by the programme at the expense of other jobs in the economy), substitution 
effects (jobs created for participants that replace those in other categories due to the 
change in relative wage costs), dead-weight effects (subsiding training that would have 
taken place in the absence of the programme), tax effects (effects of taxation on par­
ticipants’ behaviour). This paper does not include these effects the results of which are 
likely to be biased. This issue obviously depends on the size of the programme. I can 
argue that, in 1991/92 and according to my dataset, microfinance’s outreach was quite 
limited and that today the ever-increasing scale of the microfinance industry makes a 
general equilibrium approach more interesting.
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Figure 4-1: Description of the Data Set with the number of associated observations.
4 Collected in 1991/92 by the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies in collaboration with the 
World Bank, 3 microfinance programs (Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRDB), 87 villages, 15 not covered by 
microfinance. The number of individuals axe in bold and the number of households in brackets. The 
number of observations are estimated with de jure definitions (see Morduch). We are pooling over the 
three rounds the participants (to oversample participants).
1 Total number of participants using de facto definitions: 936
2 Total number of households participating using de facto definitions: 827
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Figure 4-3: Distribution of the propensity score for non-participants in villages with 
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Figure 4-4: Distribution of the propensity score for individuals in villages without access
to microfinance according to specification 1.
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Figure 4-5: Distribution of the propensity score for participants according to specification 
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Figure 4-6: Distribution of the propensity score for non-participants in villages with 
access to microfinance according to specification 3.
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Figure 4-7: Distribution of the propensity score for individuals in villages without access
to microfinance according to specification 3.
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Figure 4-8: Distribution of the corrected propensity score for participants according to 
specification 3.
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Figure 4-9: Distribution of the corrected propensity score for non-participants in villages 
with access to microfinance according to specification 3.
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Figure 4-10: Distribution of the corrected propensity score for individuals in villages
without access to microfinance according to specification 3.
Table 4.1: Propensity Score Estimates: Determinants of the Probability of Participation
Independen t Variables M eans Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3
Highest Grade Completed 2.255 0.041 0.024
(3.173) (0.03) (0.036)
Sex 0.513 -0 .8 8 6 *** -1.515*** -1.136***
(0.499) (0.123) (0.182) (0.128)
Age 22.327 0.051*** 1.224*** 1.065***
(17.422) (0.004) (0.269) (0.159)
Age of HH head 42.313 -0.046*** -0.035*** -0.014**
(12.383) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
No Adult Male in HH 0.024 1.951 2.854* 0.832***
(0.153) (1.268) (1.562) (0.308)
Parents of HH head own land 0.246 0.137 0.094
(0.56) (0.14) (0.147)
Brothers of HH head own land 0.714 0.019 -0.023
(1.224) (0.065) (0.068)
Education 0.551 0.336***
(0.497) (0.113)
Savings 1128.9 0 .0 0 0 2 *** 0 .0 0 0 2 ***
(4201.37) (0.0004) (0.00003)
Own a Non-Farming Enterprise 0.468 0.763*** 0.630***
(0.499) (0.173) (0 .1 1 1 )
Livestock Value 3273.15 0.0000397 0.00005***
(5533.9) (0.00003) (0 .0 0 0 0 2 )
HH size 6.232 -0.117*** -0.147***
(2.632) (0.041) (0.028)
Non-Agricultural Wage 4.023 -0 .0 0 2 -0.006*
(16.303) (0.004) (0.003)
Agricultural Wage 2.987 0.013** 0 .0 1 0 **
(9.755) (0.007) (0.005)
Age Squared 802 -0.033*** -0.028***
(1109.7) (0 .0 1 ) (0.006)
Age to the Power Four 1874542 -1.73E-6* -1.16E-6***
(5029988) (0.000000944) (0.000000501)
Village dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 9399 3319 4205 5037
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1502 0.3561 0.3313
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Speci­
fication 1 replicates the analysis of Pitt (1998). Specification 2 includes other control variables: landed assets, 
equipment assets, transport assets, injuries, change residence in the last 2 years, assets, expenses of the non­
farming enterprises, agricultural costs, irrigated land, fathers still alive, marital status, agricultural income, 
mother’s education, irrigated household land, mothers still alive, household land, highest grade completed by 
household head, sex of household head, no adult female in household, sisters of household head owning land, 
father’s education, revenue of non-farming enterprises, dairy products sales; all insignificant.
Table 4.2: Impact of Microfinance on log of per capita Expenditure from Matching 
with the non participants in treatment villages and individuals in control villages
using specification 3
Control group Stratification Kernel
20 10 5 0.05 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
non participants in treatment villages 
individuals in control villages
-0.035* -0.044* -0.044* 
0.028 0.028*** 0.028*
-0.039*
0.028***
-0.044*
0.028***
-0.046*
0.028***
Estimates are bootstrapped. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Specification 1 is the 
specification used by Pitt (1998), Specification 2 includes more relevant variables to maximise the explanatory power 
of the propensity score, Specification 3 retains the most significant variables in order to maximise observation numbers 
and explanatory power. I use three strata for the stratification technique of 20, 10 and 5 (the propensity score being 
between 0 and 100). A smaller stratum imposes the assumption of the Common Support but includes less observations. 
I use three bandwidths for the kernel technique of 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01. A smaller bandwidth imposes the assumption 
of Common Support while kernel matching converges to the nearest neighbour with decreasing bandwidths. Propensity 
scores are corrected for non-random programme placement by equating all village dummies to 0 for treated individuals. 
The outcome is purged from village level effects by regressing it on village dummies and accounting for residuals.
Table 4.3: Impact of Microfinance on 6 different Outcomes using a Kernel technique.
Outcomes Bandwidth of kernel
0.05 0 .0 2 0 .0 1
Variation of Log of Per Capita Expenditure -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
Log of Women Non-Land Assets 0.037 0.037 0.038
Female Labour Supply 9.503 9.507 9.521
Male Labour Supply 17.001*** 16.996*** 16.974***
Girl School Enrolment 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052***
Boy School Enrolment 0.035* 0.035 0.036
Estimates are bootstrapped. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Specification 
3 is used. I use three bandwidths for the kernel technique of 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01. A smaller bandwidth respects 
the assumption of Common Support while kernel matching converges to nearest neighbour with decreasing 
bandwidths. Propensity scores are corrected for non-random programme placement by equating all village 
dummies to 0 for treated individuals. The outcome is freed from village level effects by regressing it on village 
dummies and accounting for residuals.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
It is well recognised today that improving the investment climate fosters productive 
private investment, creates jobs and is the key to sustainable growth. However, the 
question remains whether an improvement in the investment climate would benefit the 
poor. In this thesis, I focus in particular on two institutions of prime importance for 
small informal entrepreneurs in developing countries who lack resources and bargaining 
power: the courts to enforce contracts.and the financial markets to get access to credit
Chapter 2 assesses how an improvement in the investment climate can benefit the 
poor directly. I focus in this chapter on how slow courts can affect the lives of the poor. 
There were 3.1 million cases pending in India’s 21 High Courts and 20 million in its 
subordinate courts in 2000. This chapter examines the consequences of a slow judiciary 
on the contracting behaviour of firms in India. I develop a game theoretical model which 
allows me to study how the judiciary’s efficiency affects the contracting behaviour of 
firms. I then examine how the case pendency rate in state courts in India affects the con­
tracting behaviour of 170,000 small non-agricultural informal firms from the 55th round 
of the National Sample Survey of 2000. My estimates suggest that a slow judiciary im­
plies more breaches of contract, discourages firms from undertaking relationship-specific 
investments, impedes the access of firms to formal financial institutions, and favours in­
efficient dynasties. The negative implications of having an inefficient judiciary are large 
- moving a firm from the highest to the lowest pendency state would result in a 1 0% 
improvement in firm performance.
This chapter leaves an important question open. Indeed, we would like to know 
more about what determines the speed of the judiciary. In particular, we would like 
to identify specific policy measures which would enhance judicial efficiency. This is a 
problem both for India and for large number of other countries which would suffer from
slow courts (Djankov et al, 2003). A key implication emerging from Chapter 2 is that 
the quality of the judiciary has large effects on economic performance. Finding specific 
means of speeding up courts is therefore crucial. Chapter 3 examines the reasons as to 
why the judiciary is so congested in India, and why there is variation in the quality of 
the judiciary across 24 states between 1971 and 1996. In particular, I investigate, in a 
panel-data analysis, whether amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure (1908) enacted 
in different states between 1971 and 1996 have an effect on the expected duration of a 
trial in High Court. I then investigate whether the ambiguity in this code could help 
explain violations of precedents by High Courts and therefore this expected duration of 
a trial in High Court. Using these amendments and violations of precedents by High 
Courts that have an effect on the overall speed of the judiciary as instrumental variables, 
I am then able to suggest policy reforms and even interpret causally the impact of the 
judiciary on various economic outcomes such as access to credit markets, agricultural 
and manufacturing performance, and poverty
Another key feature of a good investment climate is the ability to acces credit mar­
kets. Chapter 4 examines one type of credit institution that expands access to credit 
for the poor: microfinance, which aims to provide credit of very small amounts to the 
poor, using group-lending strategies to improve the repayment rate and solve the in­
formation asymmetry problem. Microfinance has generated a lot of hope in the past 
few years. Proponents of this informal type of finance asserted that it would serve the 
poor by providing them with access to credit, thereby alleviating poverty. It would also 
be financially sustainable due to exceptionally high repayment rates obtained through 
group lending. Using the latest developments from the evaluation literature, namely the 
technique of matching, to evaluate carefully this credit program, this chapter shows a 
positive effect of microfinance on the expenditure per capita, the supply of labour, the 
level of enrolment in school of boys and girls. For instance, participants spend 3% more 
on average than non-participants. However, participants did not experience a gain com-
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pared to non-participants in treatment villages. This seems to indicate the presence of 
positive externalities at the level of villages due to microfinance.
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